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farmland and other farm assets, and have implications for agricultural credit markets and 
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After historically high levels of net farm income in 2012 and 2013, low 
commodity and livestock prices have combined with other factors to dramatically reduce 
farm income (Kauffman and Clark 2016). These changes create financial stress for 
farmers, degrade the value of farmland and other farm assets, and have implications for 
agricultural credit markets and relationships. Most farmers and ranchers are looking for 
ways to improve financial performance, but more importantly are looking for information 
on how to mitigate the effects of financial stress in their operations. Active farmers and 
ranchers need information to survive the current and future periods of farm financial 
stress.  
The seeds of the farm crisis of the 1980s were sown during the previous decade. 
The 1970s were a decade of prosperity for American agriculture. Over the first three 
years of the decade, net farm income doubled from $34 billion to $69 billion and the 
value of farmland increased 73 percent (in real 1982 dollars). This expansion of 
agriculture was largely debt financed, with outstanding farm mortgage debt increasing 
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57 percent between 1970 and 1978 (Barnett 2000). The increase in debt was supported by 
increased commodity prices and production, with US Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, 
famously telling farmers in 1972 to “plant fence row to fence row” (Wyant 2008). In 
hindsight, this strong commodity market would only last for a short time, but long 
enough to make debt financing attractive. Soon, commodity prices would reverse course 
in response to the increased production. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, commodity prices began to decline due to excess 
supply in the market, production costs rose at the same time, and the export boom 
collapsed, creating a perfect storm for financial stress. Eventually, agricultural producers 
could no longer make loan payments on farmland with the returns generated from 
farming that land. From 1981 to February 1985, the dollar appreciated more than 70 
percent causing exports of domestic agriculture commodities to drop 50 percent by 1986. 
Declining exports coupled with low commodity prices, rising inflation, and drought sent 
net farm income and farm asset values into a downward spiral.  Between 1980 and 1987, 
the value of farm assets dropped 30 percent nationally, and as a result farm lenders 
stopped offering to refinance loans when a borrower was unable to make payment 
(Barnett 2000).  
Recently, there have been financial indications that agriculture is on the cusp of a 
new era of financial stress. Figure 1.1 shows that nominal prices for corn, wheat, and 
soybeans were lower in 2016 than they were in both 2007 and 2011 (USDA NASS 
2017a; USDA NASS 2017b; USDA NASS 2017c). The farm sector income forecast also 
projects that nominal prices for wheat and corn will be 4 percent and 3.5 percent lower 
respectively with the price received for soybeans up approximately 4.5 percent in 2018. 
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Figure 1.1: Oklahoma Crop & Cattle Prices 2007-2016 (USDA NASS 2017a; USDA 
NASS 2017b; USDA NASS 2017c) 
 
 
The 2018 Farm Sector Income Forecast produced by the USDA projects that net farm 
income will decrease approximately 6.7 percent, the lowest nominal level since 2006 as 
seen in figure 1.2 (Litkowski et al. 2018).  
 
Figure 1.2: Net Farm Income, 2000 – 2018 (Forecast) (Litkowski et al. 2018) 
 
 
While this forecast is a national projection, the outlook for Oklahoma is similar. 
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years. This pattern matches what was seen during the late 1970s and mid-1980s (figure 
1.3), a period of significant financial stress in agriculture (USDA ERS 2018). 




The Ag Finance Databook, published by the Kansas City branch of the Federal 
Reserve also reveals that the total volume of loans taken to pay for operating expenses 
has increased from 2016 to 2017. In the same time period, delinquency rates at 
commercial banks also increased (Kauffman and Clark 2017). It is highly important to 
recognize the role that interest rates play in the current farm financial climate. Historical 
data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (figure 1.4) show that the fixed 
interest rate on agricultural loans are at their lowest point since 2007, and less than half of 
what they were in 1989 (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 2018). All of the factors 
so far cited suggest that the current financial downturn in agriculture has the potential to 
devolve into something more, therefore, this research examines the effect that leverage, 































































































































Figure 1.4: Oklahoma Average Yearly Real Estate Loan Fixed Interest Rate 1987 – 






In broad terms, farm financial stress is a problem that can result in farmers taking 
actions that range from simply cutting back on planned purchases and family living 
standards to liquidating assets to pay bills, and even complete bankruptcies. All these 
actions have long-term impacts not only on those individual farmers and farm families, 
but also on rural communities, input suppliers, and others (Boehlje, Thamodaran, and 
Barkema 1985). More specifically, farm financial stress contributes to personal financial 
stress within farm households and farm families. 
Therefore, this research will be used to better understand the causes, nature and 
extent of farm financial stress. More importantly, how has farm financial performance 























The overall purpose of this research is to quantify the current extent of farm financial 
stress, compare this to previous stress periods, and determine what factors contribute the 
most to farm financial stress (e.g. prices, indebtedness, interest rates, equipment values, 
etc.). The specific objects of this research are to: 
1. Evaluate how changing commodity prices effect farm financial stress. 
2. Evaluate the effect that total debt level has on farm financial stress.  
3. Compare the performance of farms with and without livestock production. 
4. Explore the effectiveness of various management strategies that may help guide a 






REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Creating Representative Farms 
 
The concept of representative farms has been explored by agricultural economists 
for a century. While a uniform method for creating representative farms has not been 
established, a somewhat baseline definition has been. Taussig said that a representative 
farm is “… one not far in the lead, not equipped with the very latest and best plant and 
machinery, but well equipped, well led, and able to maintain itself permanently with 
substantive profits.” (Taussig 1918). Alfred Marshall put a slightly different spin on 
Taussig’s definition by saying that a representative farm is “… one which has had a fairly 
long life, and fair success, which is managed with normal ability, and which has normal 
access to the economics, external and internal, which belong to the aggregate volume of 
production; account being taken of the class of goods produced, the conditions of 
marketing them and the economic environment generally.” (Marshall 1920). Both 
Marshall’s and Taussig’s definitions are more abstract then they are empirical in nature. 
They explain the economic nature of supply and profits instead of acting as a guide to 
making management decisions.   
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Holmes in 1923 was one of the first to use the representative farm approach to 
guide management decisions. He geographically divided Iowa into different farming 
areas based on existing enterprises, farming practices and environmental factors. Holmes 
expressed his concerns about making management and adjustment decisions for groups 
of farms saying “… even a small farm is a complex economic organism and every 
individual farm departs widely in one or more important characteristics from the so-
called norm.” (Holmes 1923). Holmes’ work differs from this research, because he 
divided farms in Iowa into different groups whereas this study creates three composite 
farms from the data for all of Oklahoma. 
One of the first to specify a quantitative procedure for determining the attributes 
of the typical farm was Elliott in 1928. He defined a ‘typical farm’ as “…a modal farm in 
a frequency distribution of farms from the same universe.” (Elliott 1928). Elliott, Trapp, 
and Willard expand on the previous work which looked at the “type of farms” based on 
geography and included budgets of representative farms. These budgets reflected how 
farms adjusted budgeting in response to different prices. (Elliott, Trapp, and Willard 
1928). This research will use budgets to estimates the income and expenses of each 
enterprise. 
In evaluating Connecticut dairy farms, Davis (1936) used a different approach 
from previous studies and grouped farms in Connecticut based on the amount of labor 
used in each enterprise. Davis’ research also used data from a sample survey instead of 
census data that Elliot used. Davis importantly points out that “…the variety of factors of 
managerial ability, financial and economic circumstances, soil and physical 
characteristics, and farm resources impinging on the farmer’s net income are so many 
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that on no two farms are exactly the same factors responsible for the approximate size of 
the net income.” (Davis 1936).  
Davis’ statement is of great importance to this research since our composite farms 
are meant to be representative of a large majority of commercial farms in Oklahoma, 
however no method can accurately take into account how and/or when management 
decisions are made. In the same vein as Davis’ statement, Wilcox (1938) expressed 
concerns that previous “type-of-farming” studies failed to contribute to the field because 
previous studies did not do an adequate job connecting the fluctuations in resource use 
and their price sensitivities (Wilcox 1938). This research looks at both price sensitivity 
and will attempt to recommend management strategies for surviving period of financial 
stress. 
Returning to the use of survey data, Mighell and Black (1951) constructed 
composite farms from the responses of “representative” dairy farms. They selected dairy 
operations based on size, quality of the land farmed, family labor supply, age of the 
primary operator, and the longevity of the operation. This method was most like 
Marshall’s definition of a “representative producer” (Mighell and Black 1951). Similar 
work is currently being done by the Food and Agriculture Policy Research Institute 
(FAPRI) at the University of Missouri and the Agricultural and Food Policy Center 
(AFPC) at Texas A&M University. FAPRI and AFPC employ the use of producer panels 
to construct representative farms. The panels are similar in location, size, structure and 
type of production. While this analysis does not survey farmers, it is similar since it also 




In a discussion article, Carter (1963) identifies many shortcomings and 
weaknesses of the representative farm approach. He points out that “the ‘representative 
farm’ studies are static in nature whereas the farm firm is operating in a dynamic 
framework.” Carter suggests that any use of the representative farm approach should 
focus on a particular problem or stated purpose. He also points out that “A typical farm, 
however selected, remains typical only as long as the technology, institutions, and other 
attributing factors remain static.” (Carter 1963). It is important to consider Carter’s 
statement because while agriculture might currently be in a period of financial stress, the 
prices, yields and other factors used in this analysis can change in the course of a year or 
even a month. Nevertheless, this research will attempt to analyze the current financial 
condition of Oklahoma agriculture, and what might happen if low crop commodity prices 
continue to persist. 
Nutt and Skees (1990) utilize a Monte Carlo simulation model to simulate a corn 
and soybean farm in Kentucky’s Ohio Valley. This assessment seeks to establish 
procedures so that financial leverage will not affect the rate of return to equity, allowing 
the authors to compare farms with different debt-to-asset ratios and isolate the effects of 
government program participation. The model uses four debt-to-asset ratios (0 percent, 
20 percent, 40 percent, and 60 percent), essentially creating four different farms. Each 
farm was simulated for 10 years, 100 times to achieve the Monte Carlo statistics (Nutt 
and Skees 1990). 
Köbrich, Rehman, and Khan (2003) take a wholesale different approach to using 
representative farms as a decision-making tool. They collected information from farms in 
Chile and Pakistan and then grouped them into clusters of “roughly homogenous farmers 
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with similar circumstances for whom we can make the same recommendation.” This 
definition is a combination of Elliott’s from 1928 and Davis’ from 1936. Before grouping 
farms into clusters, the authors used a six-step approach to establish the particular 
farming system for each cluster as follows: first, determine the specific framework, 
second, select variables, third, collect data, fourth, factor analysis, fifth, cluster analyses, 
and sixth, validation. Prior to the fourth step, the authors discard any variables that show 
no variability as well as any variables that are highly correlated. After grouping farms 
into clusters, the authors use multi-variate statistical modeling to present 
recommendations for constructing representative farm models. They conclude that their 
approach would be best utilized for studies in less developed countries where farming 
systems and types can be derived from scratch (Köbrich, Rehman, and Kahn 2003). 
The authors clarify that “the inputs required at the beginning are the researchers’ 
previous experience and knowledge of the area, the objectives of the typification exercise 
and, the quantitative information that is available.” (Köbrich, Rehman, and Kahn 2003).  
Their statement forms part of the basis for this analysis since imperfect information exists 
about what the typical, average, or representative farm is in Oklahoma. 
Most recently, Zhang and Tidgren (2018) employed the use of representative farm 
models and FINPACK simulations to evaluate the current downturn in the farm economy 
as compared to the downturns of the 1920s and 1980s from a structural and regulatory 
standpoint. They also look at the causes of the downturns of the 1920s, 1980s, and the 
current farm downturn and present their outlook on if the current financial downturn in 
agriculture will devolve into a situation like was seen in the 1980s or 1920s. The authors 
employ the use of three actual farms from the three different periods to build their 
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simulation models, identifying them as Farmer A, Farmer B, and Farmer C, and then they 
evaluate three different management strategies to assess how Farmer C could improve 
their financial outlook. 
Farmer A is based off a farmer from Iowa Land Values: 1803-1967 written by 
W.G. Murray. Farmer A owned a 311-acre farm and owed $11,000 on a mortgage for 
that land. A year later, Farmer A purchased a neighboring farm of 240-acres for $95,000. 
To do this, the farmer increased the mortgage on his home farm to $45,000 and borrowed 
$45,000 to purchase the new 240-acres. This made his debt $163 per acre, and with the 
market price at the time being $400 per acre, Farmer A’s debt was less than half of the 
value of the land that he controlled (Zhang and Tidgren 2018). Farmer A began to 
encounter financial stress in 1921 when commodity prices began to fall, and eventually 
the value of the crops that Farmer A produced was less than the value of his principal and 
interest payment on his mortgages. Farmer A lost both farms in 1927 and 1928 because 
he had drained his borrowing capacity. 
Farmer B comes from the 1990 book Farming is in Our Blood by P.C. Rosenblatt. 
Farmer B started farming in the mid-1970s with 160 acres of owned land he inherited and 
500 acres of rented land. Wanting to expand his operation, Farmer B bought 320 acres at 
auction for $528,000. Farmer B paid a little more than 20 percent down and obtained two 
land loans. Loan 1 was a 10-year, $150,000 loan at 10 percent fixed interest, and loan 2 
was a 15-year variable rate loan for $250,000 from the Federal Land Bank (FLB). Farmer 
B also had a $50,000 machinery loan due in 1982 and a $30,000 annual operating loan. 
Times became tough in the early 1980s when crude oil prices doubled and the cost of 
inputs like fertilizer, seed and chemical rose by 20 percent (Zhang and Tidgren 2018). 
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Because of a strong US dollar, agricultural exports were weak which, in turn, caused the 
prices of commodities to fall below Farmer B’s cost of production, and set his farm 
income on a downward trend as well. 
By 1983 Farmer B had about $1,000 per acre outstanding on each of his land 
loan, but high interest rates were beginning to cause significant financial issues. His 
harvest in the same year was bad, but Farmer B was still current on all his debt payments, 
however his working capital was less than $25,000. In early 1984 the FLB asked Farmer 
B for $50,000 of collateral to secure the loan, but neither lender of loan 1 or loan 2 was 
able to restructure the loan or reduce the interest rate. Farmer B got a $20,000 operating 
loan at 15 percent interest and by 1985 the value of Farmer B’s land had declined by 30 
percent. The FLB called in its loan, Farmer B was unable to refinance his loans and he 
was forced to put his farm, including his 160 inherited acres, up for auction and he was 
out of business (Zhang and Tidgren 2018). 
Farmer C is based off of data collected by Iowa State University and analyzed in 
FINPACK (FINPACK 2018). Farmer C farms 1,223 acres, 223 acres are owned and 
1,000 are leased for $257 per acre. Farmer C has $200,000 in cash and $113,969 of 
prepaid expenses and supplies before the 2015 season. His land is valued at close to 
$8,000 per acre, making his total asset value above $3 million in January 2015. Farmer C 
has $301,145 remaining on his 20-year land loan at a 5 percent fixed rate, he also holds a 
five-year machinery loan for $300,000 at 5 percent fixed interest, with final payment due 
in 2019. Farmer C’s initial balance sheet is strong with a 24.3 percent debt-to-asset ratio, 
a current ratio of 2.26, and $272,886 of working capital. 
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Farmer C’s yields in 2015 were near average and therefore he did not make any 
managerial changes in his operation, however, high production costs including the rental 
rate on his rented acres caused him to earn only $42,255 of net income. Farmer C’s high 
loan payments on land and machinery caused his capital replacement margin to be 
negative. The authors point out that if Farmer C had trimmed his production expenses by 
$50 per acre or had negotiated a lower cash rent, he could have significantly improved his 
profitability. They also suggest that Farmer C could have refinanced his loans, while this 
would not affect profitability, it would slow the loss of working capital (Zhang and 
Tidgren 2018). Because Farmer C did not make any changes in management for the 2015 
season, he lost $94,146 of cash available to pay bills and debts. The value of his land also 
declined by $1,000 per acre. 
In the 2016 growing season, Farmer C had above average yields, but the prices he 
received were lower than they were in the 2015 season. The cost of production inputs 
decreased from the 2015 season and his cash rent was reduced by $50 per acre. Even 
though the value of his land decreased by $1,000, Farmer C’s debt-to-asset ratio was 23.7 
percent, a decline from the previous year. This is due mostly to the fact that Farmer C 
paid off a significant portion of his debt over the previous two years, however, because 
this farmer did not act to refinance his loans, his capital debt repayment margin was 
negative, and his term debt coverage ratio fell to 1.07. 
The first management scenario Zhang and Tidgren work through for Farmer C is 
making no change to his operation or management practices. Farmer C has not refinanced 
any of his outstanding loans and began with a healthy current ratio. He did not lower his 
production costs, except for a $10 per acre reduction in his cash rent. The authors 
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hypothesize that in 2018 the value of Farmer C’s land would drop $250 to $6,250 per 
acre. Because of lost debt repayment capacity from the previous year, Farmer C will have 
to sell some stored grain to cover debt payments and have cash on hand. Because of a 
strong balance sheet however, there is no risk of default for Farmer C. 
The second scenario evaluates what would be the result of an interest rate hike. 
The authors assume that Farmer C’s machinery and land loans are variable rate loans and 
that the rate has increased to eight percent. This rate would be more reflective of the 
interest rates of the 1920s and about half of the rates of the 1980s (Zhang and Tidgren 
2018). They also assume that the land valuation capitalization rate increased to five 
percent, up from three percent, resulting from higher interest rates. This increased 
capitalization rate would cause land values to plummet to $3,900 per acre. Although land 
values would drop by almost 50 percent, Farmer C would still have a strong balance 
sheet, but his debt-to-asset ratio would increase to 27 percent and his total interest paid 
would close to double. In this scenario, Farmer C would have to adopt some sort of cost 
management and/or improved marketing strategies (Zhang and Tidgren 2018). 
The final management situation for Farmer C is a substantial and sudden 
reduction of land values. The authors inflict a 30 percent reduction in value from the 
2017 land values, citing stagnate commodity prices and farm income. At the same time, 
they assume that interest rates would remain flat at five percent. This reduction in land 
values would decrease the total asset value on his balance sheet but would not change his 
profitability, unless a lender requests more cash or collateral for loan security. Finally, 




Between these three case studies, there are commonalities like falling farm 
income, increasing debt payments, and weakened borrowing capacity and working 
capital. Farmers A and C experience decreasing farm income because of declining 
commodity prices, which led to a draining of working capital and debt repayment 
capacity. Both farmers saw an increase in net farm income during “boom” years followed 
by a significant decline in years of financial downturn. Farmer B encountered a different 
situation where farm income was dropping while interest rates were increasing at the 
same time. These high interest rates made Farmer B’s debt repayment capacity 
deteriorate more quickly than either Farmer A or Farmer C. The most important 
observation the authors make is that “Had farmer B stayed solvent with his farming 
operation in the late 1980s, he would have actually seen a rebound of the net farm income 
largely due to substantial support from government programs to combat the 1980s farm 
crisis” (Zhang and Tidgren 2018). 
 
What Constitutes Financial Stress? 
 
Financial stress cannot be perfectly quantified. Since the farm crisis of the 1980s, 
multiple definitions and metrics have been used to evaluate financial stress in the 
agriculture sector, but there is not one that better models the causes, nature or effect of 
financial stress. Financial stress has been evaluated across a range of criteria including 
measuring liquidity, profitability, debt repayment capacity, and risk. Along with multiple 
metrics, multiple definitions have been developed as to what constitutes financial stress. 
During the farm crisis, Jolly et al. (1985) defined farm financial stress as occurring when 
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“the capacity of an individual or firm or a specific sector of the economy to adjust to the 
forces causing stress is exceeded.” Doye and Jolly (1987) say financial stress is when 
“certain economic forces assault and break down the adjustment capability of an 
individual, a firm, or a specific sector of the economy. Other authors define financial 
stress as “the inability to meet debt service payments, including principal and interest.” 
(Briggeman 2010; Briggeman 2011; Dinterman, Katchova, and Harris 2018).  
Studies done in the 1980s sought to derive the nature of the financial crisis and 
proposed potential solutions including to alleviate the effects of financial stress. Jolly et 
al. (1985) suggested that the duration of farm stress would depend on how quickly asset 
markets could rearrange ownership and credit institutions could write off unpayable debt 
and write new loans. Boehlje, Thamodaran and Barkema (1985) attributed the cause of 
the financial stress to be both lower incomes and more volatile interest rates. They 
suggested that asset restructuring, including liquidations, debt reductions, and equity 
infusions would be necessary to improve the long-term outlook for farms. 
Jolly et.al. (1985) began by looking at the incidences of financial stress in the 
farm sector as well as its intensity and duration. They evaluated financial stress based on 
four long-run characteristics: profitability, liquidity, solvency, and risk-bearing ability as 
well as some aggregate indirect indicators solely at the farm level. In their analysis they 
found that 62 percent was held by farm operators with debt-to-asset ratios over 40 
percent, 13.3 percent was held by insolvent operators and 29 percent by farms with debt-
to-asset ratios greater than 70 percent. Additionally, 64 percent of the debt was controlled 
by farms with negative cash flows (Jolly et.al., 1985). This study established baseline 
metrics for future study of financial stress in the farm sector. More recently, those 
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findings were shown to be relevant in the current financial conditions of U.S. agriculture. 
Businesses with a debt-to-asset ratio over 40 percent are more vulnerable, especially 
when combined with lower liquidity (Burns, Tulman and Harris 2015). 
Doye and Jolly (1987) sought to evaluate what structural changes would lead to a 
more stable financial outlook in agriculture. The authors use a random sample of U.S. 
farmers surveyed by Farm Journal, Iowa State University, and the University of 
Missouri. A sample of 8,000 operators was taken from the Farm Journal database. Data 
from 731 responses of commercial farm operators, defined as those with sales of $40,000 
or more per year. Responses were weighted using USDA numbers of commercial 
operators, assets, and debts by region to derive a US value. 
The authors develop a cash flow model where net cash flow (NCF) is modeled as 
a function of cash rate of return to operated assets, the value of owned assets, the value of 
rented assets, cash rental rate on rented assets, average rate of interest paid on outstanding 
debt, average rate of principal repayment on outstanding debt, level of outstanding debt, 
consumption expenditures for the farm family, off-farm income earned by the operator 
and spouse, and federal income taxes paid by the farm family. A second equation is 
created to model the amount of financial restructuring necessary for an operator with 
negative cash flow to break even. This is derived from the NCF equation. Change in NCF 
is modeled as a function of the percentage change in cash rate of return to operated 
assets, the cash rate of return to operated assets, the change in owned assets occurring in 
the restructuring process, the change in rented assets, the change in outstanding debt as a 
result of debt retirement from asset sales or debt discharge by the lender, the change in 
family living expenditures, and the change in off farm income. 
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The equations mentioned above are used to model the various farm operators’ 
response to economic changes and/or adoption of government policy. In the simulation, a 
general series of financial adjustment is used for operators who have a negative NCF as 
follows: the amount of off-farm income is increased, the rate of return to operated assets 
is improved, additional assets are rented, on farms that qualify for financial assistance 
from programs, government program payments are applied to cash shortfalls, a partial 
liquidation of assets, and ultimately there’s a total liquidation of assets, resulting in the 
farm operator leaving the farming business. A different series of steps is used if an 
operator has a positive NCF. 
The authors set three criteria for what defines farm financial failure in their 
simulation. First, if the outstanding debt is greater than the current market value of assets. 
Second, if the operator is forced to completely liquidate assets in order to achieve a 
positive cash flow. Third, if the ratio of NCF to equity is less than -0.2. The authors also 
have defined certain farms as “technically insolvent” if a farms debt-to-asset ratio 
exceeds the cash recovery rate. These “technically insolvent” farms own no assets, or 
have severe financial problems as indicated by the NCF to equity ratio are assumed to 
exit the industry at the end of the year in which they are defined as financial failures. The 
model looks at the effects of leverage, cash flow constraints, and income on survivability 
(Doye and Jolly 1987). 
In analyzing Kansas farms, Featherstone, Schroder, and Burton (1988) take a 
different approach to quantifying financial stress in the farm sector. Instead of looking at 
a farm’s debt-to-asset ratio they evaluated a farm’s performance based on their mean real 
rate of return to equity. The authors quantify the proportion of poor performance due to 
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excess leverage, high interest rates, or low rates of return to assets by identifying an 
average (or target) leverage ratio and interest rate for financially unsuccessful farms. For 
farms with a negative mean real rate of return to equity, the authors used the previously 
listed metrics to decompose the farm’s financial problem into its constituent parts 
(Featherstone, Schroder, and Burton 1988). 
At the end of the test, the geometric mean real rate of return to equity varied from 
-37.1 percent to 30.4 percent. Of the 492 observed farms, 283 had a geometric mean real 
rate of return to equity greater than 0, and 209 had a rate of return to equity less than 0. 
The geometric mean real rate of return to assets ranged from -9.7 percent to 30.1 percent. 
The leverage ratios for all farms ranged from 0 percent to 81.1 percent. The estimated 
real interest rates ranged from -10 percent to 9.9 percent. In the authors interpretation, the 
results suggested that 42 percent of the financially stressed farms would not benefit from 
debt buy-downs by the government since their most significant problem was low rates of 
returns to assets (Featherstone, Schroder, and Burton 1988).  
Financial stress also affects new farmers and young farmers. D’ Antoni, Mishra, 
and Chintawar (2009) developed a multinomial logit model to predict financial stress of 
farms owned/operated by young and beginning farmer. Farms were classified into four 
groups based on their financial position ranging from a favorable financial position to a 
vulnerable financial position. The authors found that farm ownership plays an important 
role in the financial position of the farm business. They suggest that young and beginning 
farmers who are tenants are more likely to be financially vulnerable compared to full 
owners due to the fact that tenant farmers have an additional debt burden. Tenants are 1.4 
percent more likely to be financially stressed than full owners. Results show that 
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residential/lifestyle farms (small farms where the operators main occupation is other than 
farming) and large farms (farm sales >$500,000) are more likely to be financially 
vulnerable compared to farms in a favorable financial position (D’ Antoni, Mishra, and 
Chintawar 2009). 
Benchmarks developed by Oklahoma State University groups various levels of 
financial stress into a three-color system. The colors (green, yellow, and red) represents a 
good, fair, or poor farm financial position. Green zone farms have a debt-to-asset ratio of 
0 to 30 percent, yellow zone farms have a debt to asset ratio of 31 to 59 percent and red 
zone farms have a debt to asset ratio of 60 percent or greater (Doye 2014). The Farm 
Financial Standards Council also uses this same method of benchmarking with slightly 
altered thresholds. This analysis will use the Oklahoma State benchmark levels in this 
analysis. It is important to note that leverage is not the only or best measure of financial 
stress. A number of financial measures including measures of solvency, profitability, and 
debt repayment capacity can also be used to evaluate financial stress. 
Burns, Tulman, and Harris (2015) approach the topic by using a three-step 
approach. First, they compare the debt repayment capacity utilization and debt to asset 
percentage using both old and new ARMS data. Second, they classify a farm’s financial 
position using a combination of the debt to asset percentage and net farm income. Lastly, 
they used a synthetic credit rating model to calculate the probability of default based on 
three criteria: capital debt repayment capacity, owner equity as a percentage of assets, 
and working capital as a percentage of assets. They found that a further decline in land 
values will only increase the leverage positions of certain sectors of the agriculture 
industry. Businesses with debt to asset ratios over 40 percent are more vulnerable, 
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especially when combined with lower liquidity. Larger farms (those with sales exceeding 
$1,000,000) are more vulnerable to a downturn in land values because they have higher 
debt to asset ratios and rent the majority of their land. Additionally, net land renters are 
more vulnerable when land values drop 35 percent. They note that the current financial 
climate does not resemble the climate of the 1980s due to historically low interest rates 
and considerably lower mean leverage positions. 
 
Options to Alleviate Financial Stress 
 
Brake and Boehlje (1985) suggested five short-term public policy methods to 
achieve greater financial stability in the agriculture sector. First is debt restructuring, 
including refinancing and converting short and intermediate term loans into long-term 
loans. The implication of this is that changing the loan term reduces the annual debt 
payment, in turn improving cash flow. The second policy option is principal forgiveness 
and debt write downs. A debt write-down acknowledges that the value of an asset has 
fallen below the amount it was financed at, a common situation in the 1980s however less 
common today. The principal forgiveness option is another method of reducing the 
annual debt obligation. The authors point out that “principal forgiveness represents a cost 
to the lender, and a principal buy-down is a cost to the taxpayers” (Brake and Boehlje 
1985). 
The third option is an interest rate buy down, the implications of which are 
discussed later. Option four is a moratorium on foreclosures. The authors suggest this 
approach as a way for the courts to facilitate borrowers and creditors to reaching a 
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solution together. This was largely achieved with the creation of Chapter 12 of the 
bankruptcy code. The final policy option is to change asset ownership. This approach is 
offered as a means to avoid asset liquidation by having lenders hold the title to assets and 
leasing the asset back to the debtor in place of the debtor making payments on the 
borrowed asset. 
Jolly and Doye (1985) discuss a similar approach. Their suggestions include the 
creation of landholding entities whereby the landholding company could buy or lease 
properties and assets from financially stressed farmers and the farmer would be able to 
lease the asset back, reducing their debt obligation. The authors also evaluate a policy 
option of “do nothing.” They say “a number of policy options already exist that will buy 
time” (Jolly and Doye 1985). Under this options, the authors assume that financial issues 
will be worked out between the farmer and their lenders rather than having to involve 
government policy in alleviating financial stress (Jolly and Doye 1985). 
Boehlje, Thamodaran, and Barkema (1985) identify that some government 
policies have contributed to financial stress rather than alleviated it by encouraging more 
debt utilization and expanding farm size (Boehlje, Thamodaran, and Barkema 1985). A 
number of potential policies to alleviate financial stress are suggested, such as interest 
rate buy downs, debt moratoria, debt restructuring, and asset restructuring. Most authors 
agree that while interest rate buy downs are effective at reducing the debt burden, they 
are prohibitively expensive. (Boehlje, Thamodaran, and Barkema 1985; Brake and 
Boehlje 1985; Doye and Jolly 1987).  
Hughes, Richardson, and Rister (1985) sought to characterize the effects of 
financial stress on the farm sector, evaluate the macroeconomic policies in agriculture, 
24 
 
and identify what caused the financial stress of the 1980s. The authors concluded that if 
government policies were to be continued, it would make the farm sector less prepared to 
handle exogenous shocks, less productive, and more concentrated. They also recommend 
“agricultural producers thoroughly investigate any potential impacts of future 
economic/farm policy scenarios before they make any major capital investment” 
(Hughes, Richardson, and Rister 1985). Lastly, they point out that the problems of the 
1980s extended beyond the farm sector. The impacts of sustained financial stress could 
result in lowered domestic production, a concentration of domestic suppliers, and 
diminished rural communities. 
The work done by Boehlje (1986) is similar to that of Brake and Boehlje (1985), 
Jolly and Doye (1985), and Boehlje, Thamodaran, and Barkema (1985). The author 
suggests that two approaches could help ease the financial stress in the agriculture sector. 
The first was to return to the economic policies of the 1970s that resulted in rapidly 
increasing land values, an expanding export market, and increasing profit margins. The 
second option would be for agriculture and industry to adapt to a new environment by 
restructuring to be able to weather periods of tight profit margins and poor export 
markets.  
Long run adjustments include the option of mothballing excess capacity in 
agriculture as a means to stabilize the financial outlook of the agriculture sector. 
Specifically, the author suggests converting 20 to 30 million acres of erosive or low 
yielding farmland to nonuse as a way to simultaneously reduce excess production and 
reduce soil erosion. Other policy options include lowering resource values, debt 
reductions, restructuring asset ownership, and lowering interest rates (Boehlje 1986). 
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Alternatively, Batte, Farr, and Lee (1989) argue that reduction or deferrals are not 
effective in stabilizing a highly leveraged farm business. They evaluate a 700 acre family 
farm using the Farm Financial Simulation Model to determine the effects of policies that 
were designed to reduce the loan obligations of the farm. Measures of solvency, 
profitability, and cash flow of the representative farm are evaluated to determine the 
success. The authors recommend that financial management education and counselling 
for farm business that have a reasonable chance of survival would be more effective and 
less costly than credit subsidies. They conclude that “financial stability in the farm sector 
will be achieved through improved profitability, not credit subsidies.” (Batte, Farr, and 
Lee 1989) 
Arguably the most important government policy instituted to help alleviate the 
effects of financial stress is the creation of Chapter 12 bankruptcy. Dinterman, Katchova, 
and Harris (2018) detail how important this policy has been. The passage of the Family 
Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986 made Chapter 12 bankruptcy the preferred option for 
farms to ease financial stress because it allowed the farm business to continue operation 
after the creation of a debt restructuring plan. Congress extended the expiration date of 
Chapter 12 provisions 11 times, and eventually in 2005, passed the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA). BAPCPA amended Chapter 12 of 
the bankruptcy code, making it a permanent option. The amendment also allowed for 
higher debt limits, and implemented less strict income requirements than before 





On and Off-Farm Effects of Financial Stress 
 
Financial stress in the farm sector has impacts beyond the farm gate. Ginder, 
Stone, and Otto (1985) analyzed the effects that financial stress in the farm sector has on 
agribusiness firms and rural communities. Evaluating data from the state of Iowa, they 
determined that the financial crisis was the primary reason for an 18 percent decrease in 
Iowa’s real retail and services sales from 1979-1984. They also discovered that farmers 
were continuing their outmigration from rural areas, reducing the economic base for 
small towns. However, only 13 percent of farmers who ceased farming for financial 
reasons moved away from the town in which they farmed. The authors point out that a 
major disruption of the economies of rural communities was averted due to off farm 
income and employment (Ginder, Stone, and Otto 1985). 
Leistritz et al. (1986) analyze the effects of financial stress on the off-farm work 
behavior of farm operators and their spouses in North Dakota. The study uses 
discriminate and regression analysis to examine effects of selected individual, family, 
farm, area, and financial characteristics. The data are from a 1985 survey of 933 farm 
operators. The authors express the relationship by modeling the supply of off-farm labor 
as a function of the individual characteristics of farm operators and spouses, family 
characteristics, farm characteristics, area characteristics, and financial characteristics. 
Selected findings of their study were that both operators and spouses who worked 
off the farm saw lower levels of net farm income and higher debt-to-asset ratios than 
those who did not work off-farm. Older operators or those who operated large farms or 
dairy farms tended not to be employed off the farm. Operators with higher levels of 
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education, higher debt-to-asset ratios, and with spouses who were employed off the farm 
were more likely to hold off farm jobs. Operators who had children between the ages of 5 
and 18 were less likely to be employed off-farm. A portion of farm spouses sought off-
farm work to supplement farm income that was inadequate to support family living. 
Operators of crop farms worked an additional 24 days off the farm compared to operators 
of other types of farms (Leistritz et al. 1986). 
 Toward the end of the farm crisis of the 1980s, Petrulis et al. (1987) looked at the 
affect farm financial stress was having on rural America. They identify that typically loss 
of farm workers occurred when gains were made in farm productivity and due in large 
part to the amount off-farm jobs. However, the 1980s saw the opposite, economic growth 
had been weak. The authors suggested that farming dependent areas transitioning to a 
more diverse economy could be difficult, mainly because “rural communities have many 
specialized human and business assets that may not be readily useable in other parts of 
the economy” (Petrulis et al. 1987). It could be argued that with advancements in 
technology, this no longer applies to rural America.  
 Briggeman (2011) looks at how off-farm income has become a critically 
important part of the financial health of the farm business. In 2008, 90 percent of all 
income for farm households came from off-farm sources. This exposes almost all farm 
operators to economic factors outside the farm gate much more than at any time in the 
past. If a farm operator, or their spouse, lose an off-farm job there is a potential that a 
farm operator wouldn’t be able to cover their debt payments. The age of a farm operator 
also affects how important off-farm income is to the financial health of a farm business. 
Briggeman shows that farmers under the age of 35 are the most dependent on off-farm 
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income. In 2008, 93 percent of young farmers income was earned from off farm sources, 
compared to 68 percent for operators older than 35 (Briggeman 2011). 
 Key, Prager, and Burns (2017) look at how the type of farming operation effects 
farm income. They analyze 18 years of data from the Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey. Their results show that household income is more volatile on farms with assets in 
excess of $3 million. The household income of crop farms is more volatile than on 
livestock farms. 77 percent of income variation comes from farm income. Finally, the 
authors found that farm household income volatility was reduced by all types of 
government program payments (Key, Prager, and Burns 2017). 
The ultimate step that can be taken for farms experiencing financial stress is 
bankruptcy. Dinterman, Katchova, and Harris (2018) look at the factors that influence 
bankruptcy decisions. They find that the regional unemployment rate and bankruptcy rate 
share a positive association. They also point out that it is mainly macroeconomic factors 
(interest rate, unemployment rate, etc.) that influence farm bankruptcies rather than 
microeconomic ones. While this option is a “last resort”, its advantage is that it brings 
lenders and borrowers together and allows farmers to continue operations after 
developing a debt repayment plan (Dinterman, Katchova, and Harris 2018). 
 
The Farm Crisis of the 1980s Compared to Today’s Conditions 
 
In an attempt to pinpoint the exact causes of the financial crisis of the 1980s Jolly 
and Doye (1985) isolate four events. First, the expanded international trade in the early 
1970s. Second, the fiscal and monetary policy that kept interest rates near the inflation 
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rate. Third, the initiation of inflation control policies by the Federal Reserve in 1979. 
Fourth, the recession of 1981 that reduced the inflation rate. The authors also identify the 
high interest rates of the day that caused agricultural assets to be a less attractive 
investment than the alternatives available in the marketplace (Jolly and Doye 1985). 
Boehlje (1986) points entirely to the economic events of the 1970s as the cause of 
the farm financial crisis of the 1980s. During the 1970s, growth in the agriculture sector 
was built on debt financing, when interest rates rose farmland values declined sharply, 
and farmers had difficulties making loan payments. Boehlje also identifies four 
characteristics of the financial stress that occurred in the 1980s. First, the debt-to-income 
ratio of the average farmers was higher due to reduced income. Second, the role of non-
farm/off-farm income increased. Third, farmers attempted to carry a much larger debt 
load. Fourth, debt was having to be repaid at a quicker rate, this was instituted by 
institutional lenders as a means to reduce their exposure to interest rate risk (Boehlje 
1986). 
Peoples et al. (1992) reach all the back to the 1950s to identify the cause(s) of the 
1980s farm financial crisis. The authors describe farm finance in the 1950s as “pay as you 
go” which kept a lid on growth in the agricultural sector. Farmers embarked on a more 
aggressive course of borrowing in the 1950s. Farm debt eventually doubled in the 1960s 
and then tripled by the end of the 1970s. When commodity prices dropped and the export 
markets collapsed, the farm sector too collapsed. The authors suggest that “in terms of 
wealth generation, the most successful farmers made money by aggressively adopting 
new technologies that enabled the farm operation to expand” (Peoples et al. 1992). 
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The federal government was slow to respond to the events of the early 1980s. 
Regulators of agricultural credit, like the Farm Credit Administration and the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, were also slow to adapt to the changing 
economic environment. At the time, Congress and the President were of the opinion that 
the financial crisis in agriculture was temporary, and existing economic policy would be 
enough to manage the situation. However, Congress was forced to pass multiple pieces of 
legislation eventually creating the Farm Credit Service Assistance Board and the Federal 
Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac). Today the Farm Credit Administration 
does not receive any appropriations from the federal government, but instead is supported 
by its member institutions (Peoples et al. 1992). 
Zhang (2017) address the question of whether we will see the current financial 
situation turn into a crisis like that of the 1980s. He presents four points for why he feels 
it is unlikely the agriculture sector will go through another financial collapse. The first is 
stronger real income build-up prior to the current financial downturn. From 2003 to 2013, 
real net income grew by 8.1 percent per year, compared to 0.2 percent per year from 1910 
to 1920 and -3.2 percent from 1973 to 1981. Second is historically low interest rates. In 
the 1980s, the mortgage payment on the typical farmland loan was three times higher 
than the typical cash rent and extending the repayment from 15 to 30 years did “almost 
nothing” to alleviate the financial burden faced by landowners. However, the current low 
interest rate environment makes loan restructuring a potential option (Zhang 2017). 
The third point presented is more prudent agricultural lending in part driven by 
more stringent regulations. The mass expansion in agriculture during the 1970s was 
largely debt driven and when interest rates began to rise in the 1980s, this caused the 
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collapse of many farmers and agriculture banks. The current situation shows a much 
better outlook since the amount of debt is lower than it was during the 1980s, as evidence 
by the low US farm debt-to-asset ratio and the low rate of delinquency on farm loans 
(Zhang 2017). The final reason the author presents for why it is unlikely the current 
financial downturn will be like the farm crisis of the 1980s is that there is a stronger 
government safety net. Zhang notes that in 1987, 50 million acres of farmland in the 
United States was covered by the Federal Crop Insurance program. In 2015, 25 million 
acres of farmland was covered in Iowa alone (Zhang 2017). 
Stephen Gabriel, Chief Economist with the Farm Credit Administration argues 
that the economic conditions of the 1970s, including a weak U.S. dollar and unexpected 
wheat demand from the Soviet Union, set up agriculture to fail in the 1980s. The 
confluence of historically high interest rates, a spike in oil prices, the double-dip 
recession of the 1980s, and a strengthening U.S. dollar all hammered the U.S. agriculture 
sector into the ground. Gabriel distinguished that the Farm Credit System is much more 
prepared to withstand a financial crisis today than they were in the 1980s. Changes in 
loan underwriting practices and increased system-wide capitalization will be the cushion 
(Gabriel 2017). 
Zhang and Tidgren (2018) take the work of Zhang (2017) and expand on it by 
comparing the current farm financial downturn with the financial situations of the 1980s 
and 1920s. The authors discuss two distinct categories; economic factors (including 
interest rates and income), and the regulatory environment (including lending regulations, 
lending practices, and the availability of agricultural credit). In terms of income, real 
income growth was stronger before the current downturn due mostly to high commodity 
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prices which grew net farm income and placed producers in a better position to ride out a 
financial downturn. According to Dr. Neil Harl, gains in gross farm income and land 
value during the 1980s were “illusionary” and being bolstered by inflation (Harl 1990).  
Historically low interest rates also have played a key factor in the current 
financial situation. Zhang and Tidgren compare the Treasury constant maturity rate and 
farmland mortgage rates and find that “…the interest situation much more closely 
resembles that of the 1920s more than the 1980s” (Zhang and Tidgren 2018). The 
implication of this observation is that since current interest rates are significantly lower 
than they were in the 1980s and moderately lower than the 1920s, loan restructuring is a 
possible option for farm managers looking to reduce their financial burden. Some farm 
lenders are now recommending to their clients to refinance loans, capturing more 
favorable interest rates and improve their debt repayment capacity (ABA 2017). 
As they look at today’s regulatory environment when compared to the regulatory 
environment of the 1920s and 1980s, the authors state that “the current environment is 
more highly regulated, lenders employ more stringent underwriting practices, and banks 
are subject to higher capitalization requirements” (Zhang and Tidgren 2018). Alongside 
these regulatory changes in the industry, the landscape of farm lending is dramatically 
different than is was in either two of the comparable time periods. In 1920, 70 percent of 
farmland mortgages were held by private individuals compared to 31 percent in 1980, 
and 5.6 percent in 2016 (Zhang and Tidgren 2018).  
The diversification of lenders is different as well. Today the Farm Credit Service 
writes approximately 46 percent of farmland loans and commercial banks write 
approximately 38 percent. Commercial banks wrote nine percent of farmland loans in 
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1980 and 13 percent in 1920. The authors point out that in 1980, commercial banks wrote 
40 percent of non-real estate debt and that the shift to more institutional lending in 
agriculture has been accompanied by an increase in financial regulations. An increase in 
agricultural lending at commercial banks has also led to more consolidation in the 
banking sector (Zhang and Tidgren 2018). 
In 2017, 1,421 financial institutions met the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation’s (FDIC) definition of an “agricultural” or “farm” bank, whereas in 1980, 
4,316 institutions met this definition (Zhang and Tidgren 2018). Consolidation of banks 
and lending institutions has caused the loan portfolios to become more diversified. The 
authors point to this diversification and the creation of Farmer Mac as the main reasons 
why it is unlikely that we will experience a widespread collapse of agricultural banks and 
the agricultural industry like was seen in the 1980s. This is not to say that there is no risk 
in agricultural lending or borrowing, quite the contrary. Risk still exists, when downward 
financial trends hit agriculture lenders are still less likely to renew operating loans for 
borrowers experiencing financial stress (Zhang and Tidgren 2018). 
Stemming from what occurred in the 1980s, lenders have made changes to their 
lending practices and policies to avoid a repeat of the 1980s financial crisis. Regulators 
have increased loan underwriting requirements and lenders have adopted more 
conservative lending practices. In the 1980s, easily available credit made land prices 
jump, allowing farmers to use inflated land values to expand their operations by obtaining 
new loans. In this era, lenders regularly would use inflated market values of assets and 
current crop prices to make lending decisions rather than conducting a cash flow analysis. 
Regulations now require that lenders use cash flow as opposed to the value of assets or 
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collateral to evaluate loan eligibility (Zhang and Tidgren 2018). In addition to these 
internal changes, federal banking and lending regulations have changes dramatically as 
well. 
Today, the FDIC requires all its member institutions to use prudent underwriting 
practices. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which supervises banks, 
requires banks to avoid a concentration of agriculture-based loans, and places set limits 
on lending activities, requiring the loan to value ratio for farmland loans to be less than 
85 percent. The OCC handbook directs that lenders should base the value of collateral on 
expected average cash flow over multiple years as opposed to the market value of assets 
(OCC 2017). Although the OCC allows a loan to value ratio of less than or equal to 85 
percent, the Farm Credit Service’s standard operating practice is a 50 percent loan to 
value ratio (Zhang and Tidgren 2018). An increase in capitalization requirements has 
accompanied more stringent lending practices in the financial sector. 
Federal regulations did not specify a numeric requirement for the capital holding 
of banks prior to the 1980s, but by 1988, federal regulations had been amended to require 
that banks hold more low-risk capital. The authors draw the comparison “in contrast, the 
agricultural banks that failed in the 1980s tended to have more high-risk capital and fewer 
low-risk assets such as federal government securities” (Zhang and Tidgren 2018). Today, 
all FDIC insured banks are required to maintain a total capital to total risk-weighted asset 
ratio of eight percent. Since the 1980s, farm banks have been increasing their reserves of 
capital which will provide them with a buffer to weather another downturn in the farm 
economy (Zhang and Tidgren 2018). 
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Zhang and Tidgren argue that the current downturn in the farm economy can be 
traced down as a liquidity and working capital problem and not a solvency problem like 
was seen in the 1980s. They also present three economic and regulatory reasons they feel 
that the current farm downturn is unlikely to devolve into a situation like the 1980s. First, 
when they compare the three periods of boom and bust in agriculture, the growth of farm 
income has been stronger in recent decades than it was in the 1920s or 1980s. Second, 
banking regulators and farm lenders have made their loan underwriting requirements 
more stringent including basing lending decisions off of cash flow analysis rather than 
the market value of collateral. Third, the interest rate environment of today is much more 
favorable than it was in the 1920s or 1980s which limits the amount of debt held by 
farmers and banks and keeps asset values strong (Zhang and Tidgren 2018). 
Dinterman, Katchova, and Harris (2018) point to the rapid rise in farmland value 
followed by a sudden drop in the value paired with historically high interest rates as the 
cause of the 1980s farm crisis. Farmers had easy access to credit during this time and net 
farm income was on the decline. The trend of declining net farm income and increasing 
debt use has reoccurred and is projected to continue beyond 2017. The current trends 
follow a period of rapid appreciation of land values and net farm incomes, paralleling the 
financial crisis of the 1980s. An important difference between the 1980s farm crisis and 
the current economic climate the authors identify is the ability of farms to seek financial 
relief through Chapter 12 bankruptcy. This option changes the farmer-lender relationship 







 While no study exists that lays out a complete framework for this analysis, pieces 
of previous studies will serve as the guide for the methodology of this work. The work of 
Zhang and Tidgren (2018) will serve as the main framework for how representative farms 
are used in this study. Instead of using actual farms as the representative farms, this study 
will create composite farms from available data. This analysis will use FINPACK for the 
simulations like the work of Zhang and Tidgren (2018). After farms have been simulated 
10 years forward, measures of liquidity, solvency, profitability, and debt repayment 
capacity will be evaluated in comparison to the work of Jolly et al. (1985). Jolly et al. 
(1985) also established the 40 percent debt-to-asset ratio threshold for financial stress. 
The work of Doye (2014) established the other financial standards that will be used. 
 It is important to recognize the differences between the 1980s and now as these 
differences alter the expectations of the effects of the current financial stress. One of the 
main factors that exacerbated the problems of the 1980s was historically high interest 
rates. These high interest rates caused debt repayment and cash flow problems for 
producers (Jolly and Doye 1985; Boehlje 1986; Peoples et al. 1992). Today’s 
environment is markedly different with interest rates at historic lows. While crop prices 
are creating cash flow issues for producers, Zhang (2017) feels it is unlikely that the 
current financial stress in agriculture is unlikely to degrade into a full-fledged financial 
crisis.  Zhang and Tidgren (2018) point to the changes that have been made in the 








Conceptual Framework and Contentions 
 For this analysis, three different representative farms were created, a crop farm, a 
cow-calf ranch, and a diversified farm that combines the crop and cow-calf farms into 
one operation. Each farm type was individually analyzed at three leverage positions: low, 
medium, and high. 
All Farms 
To achieve the various leverage positions on each type of farm, it is assumed that 
the loans on the low leverage farms are older and the high leverage farms are newer, so 
that the low leverage farms have paid off a greater portion of their loans at the beginning 
of the first year of simulation. For equipment and titled vehicles, the low leverage farm 
took out the loan in 2014, the medium leverage farm took out the loan in 2015 and the 
high leverage farm took out the loan in 2017. On livestock and cattle pens the low 
leverage secured their loan in 2010, the medium leverage in 2012, and the high leverage 
farm in 2015. Real estate was purchased in 1993 for the low leverage cases, 2003 for the 
medium leverage farms, and 2013 in the high leverage case. In the case of the low and 
medium leveraged diversified farms, their personal loans were taken out in 2017 and 
2018 respectively. 
All machinery is financed on five-year, 3.25 percent fixed rate loans (John Deere 
US 2017). Prices for machinery and implements were taken directly from the John Deere 
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website on December 18, 2017 (John Deere US 2017). All vehicles are financed on five-
year, 5 percent fixed rate loan (Ford Motor Credit Company 2017). All land is financed 
on 30-year loans. Since the land purchase date is highly varied, interest rate on the land 
loans are 8.9 percent for the low leverage farms, 7.325 percent for the medium leverage 
farms, and 5.975 percent for the high leverage farms (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City 2018). The personal loan has a six percent rate and a three-year term. A 20 percent 
down payment is assumed on all tractors, implements, titled vehicles, and real estate.  
Tractors, implements and vehicles are sold at the end of year five and new 
machinery is purchased at the same time. The salvage value for equipment is calculated 
using formula 3.1 which comes from Iowa State University’s Ag Decision Maker 
(Edwards 2015). Property tax is assumed to be $2 per owned acre of land and personal 
property tax is assumed to be 1 percent of the market value of equipment. The farm 
operator has a spouse with an off-farm job that contributed $40,000 to the business, and 
$60,000 per year is withdrawn for farm family living expenses. General farm liability 
insurance costs $2,200 per year. 
(3.1) 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
Crop Farm 
The baseline representative crop farm for this study is 444 acres, the average 
Oklahoma farm is 438 acres (ODAFF 2017). It is assumed that out of the 444 acres, 111 
acres (25 percent) is owned and 333 acres (75 percent) is leased. The proportion of 
owned and leased land was approximated from the Kansas Farm Management 
Association South Central Region Summary Books from 2007 to 2016. The actual 
averages are 26.9 percent owned and 73.1 percent leased, for ease of computation, these 
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numbers are rounded to 25 percent and 75 percent. Land is rented for $31.60 per acre 
which is the Oklahoma average from 2007 to 2016 (USDA NASS 2017d). Three crops 
are grown: winter wheat (representing cereal grains), corn (representing feed grains) and 
soybeans (representing oil crops). Each crop is allocated 148 acres, or 
1
3
 of the 444 acres 
per crop.  
For the baseline farm, the three-year average yield is used to reflect average 
conditions. The three-year average is a better representation of average conditions 
opposed to the 10-year average yield because the three-year yield incorporates both 
historical yields and advancements in genetics and technology. The average yield is 
calculated from USDA reports for Oklahoma for the years 2015 to 2017 for wheat and 
2014 to 2016 for corn and soybeans. This difference can be attributed to data reporting 
since wheat is a summer harvested crop with corn and soybeans being fall harvested 
crops. Corn yield is estimated to be 132 bushels per acre (USDA NASS 2017f; USDA 
NASS 2016a), wheat yield is 33 bushels per acre (Marshall 2017) and soybean yield is 29 
bushels per acre (USDA NASS 2017g; USDA NASS 2016b). Yields are assumed to be 
constant throughout the 10-year simulation.  
The prices received used in the baseline scenario are the Oklahoma 10-year 
average price aggregated from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) data 
(figure 1.1). The 10-year averages are $4.67 per bushel for corn (USDA NASS 2017a), 
$5.91 per bushel for wheat (USDA NASS 2017b), and $10.72 per bushel for soybeans 
(USDA NASS 2017c). Prices are assumed to be constant throughout the 10-year 
simulation1, and all grain is sold as soon as it is harvested and not stored for future sale. 
                                                          
1 Except when prices are shocked as described later. 
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Assets and liabilities are detailed in table 3.1. Current assets range from $35,000 
in the low leverage case, to $20,000 in the medium leverage case, and $15,000 in the high 
leverage case. Current assets include the value of cash and checking accounts and prepaid 
expenses and supplies. The crop farm utilizes a tractor, planter, seed drill, and pickup 
truck totaling $363,158 of intermediate assets. Long term assets include the value of 
owned land and the value of buildings and improvements.  A market-value based balance 
sheet is used to better reflect the changing values of land in the simulation. Land prices 
come from the Oklahoma State University Land Values website (OSU 2018). In the low 
and medium leverage cases, the value of the land is greater than the purchase price of the 
land. The farm operator holds $260,000 of personal assets, including a $250,000 life 
insurance policy. The specific values for current assets, buildings and improvements, and 
personal assets at each leverage position are arbitrarily chosen to achieve the desired year 
zero debt-to-asset ratio. 
Current liabilities are $25,000 in the low leverage case, $50,000 for medium 
leverage and $75,000 for high leverage. Current liabilities are accounts payable and other 
accrued expenses. Current loans are $15,000 in the low leverage case, $25,000 for 
medium leverage and $30,000 for high leverage. These represent an annual revolving line 
of credit for the operator. The intermediate loan category covers the loan the operator 
takes out on their machinery, vehicles, and equipment. The value of long-term loans is 
the mortgage on the operator’s farm.  
The low leverage farm was purchased in 1993 for $530 per acre, the medium 
leverage farm was purchased in 2003 for $714 per acre, and the high leverage farm was 
purchased in 2013 for $1,955 per acre (OSU 2018). Land purchase values are from the 
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Oklahoma State University Extension Agricultural Land Values page (OSU 2018). 
Finally, the low leverage farm and medium leverage farms have $60,000 and $90,000 of 
personal liabilities, respectively, while the high leverage case has $0. The specific values 
for current liabilities, current loans, personal liabilities, and land purchase years at each 
leverage position are arbitrarily chosen to achieve the desired year zero debt-to-asset 
ratio. 
Table 3.1: Crop Farm Beginning Balance Sheet Summaries 
CROP FARM 



















































































The baseline representative cow-calf operation is 3,000 acres with 444 acres 
owned, and the remaining 2,556 acres are leased. Land is leased at a rate of $11.75 per 
acre, the Oklahoma average from 2007 to 2016 (USDA NASS 2017e). The cow-calf farm 
maintains a herd of 300 cows and 10 bulls. The total acreage for the cow-calf farm 
assumes 10 acres per cow-calf pair. The owned acreage for the cow-calf farm matches 
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the total acreage for the crop farm. A conception rate of 87.3 percent and a death loss rate 
of 4.2 percent is used, leaving 251 calves to sell each year (OSU 2017). Calves are sold at 
525 pounds (OSU 2017) for $149.78 per hundredweight, immediately after they are 
weaned. The sale price is the Oklahoma average annual steer and heifer calf price for 
2007 to 2016 from the Livestock Marketing Information Center. 
Assets and liabilities for each cow-calf farm leverage position are detailed in table 
3.2. Beginning current assets are $35,000 for the low leverage producer, $25,000 for the 
medium leverage producer and $15,000 for the higher leverage producer. Current assets 
include the value of cash and checking accounts and prepaid expenses and supplies. The 
operation, at each leverage position, has $203,373 of livestock held for sale, representing 
251 calves sold for a total of $197,373, 30 cull cows (10 percent cull rate) sold for $175 
per head, and 5 cull bulls (50 percent cull rate) sold for $150 per head at the beginning of 
the simulation. A total of $540,832 of intermediate assets are held; which consists of a 
front-end loader, feed truck, pickup truck, and a livestock trailer at each leverage 
position.  
Long term assets include the value of owned land and the value of buildings and 
improvements. A market-value based balance sheet is used to better reflect the changing 
values of land in the simulation. Land prices come from the Oklahoma State University 
Land Values website (OSU 2018). In the low and medium leverage cases, the value of 
the land is greater than the purchase price of the land. Additionally, the farm owns a 
working pen system with a squeeze chute that was financed at purchase that are included 
in the value of long-term assets. The farm operator holds $260,000 of personal assets, 
including a $250,000 life insurance policy. The specific values for current assets, cull 
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cows and bulls, buildings and improvements, and personal assets at each leverage 
position are arbitrarily chosen to achieve the desired year 0 debt-to-asset ratio. 
Current liabilities are $10,000 in the low leverage case, $20,000 for medium 
leverage and $30,000 for high leverage. Current liabilities reflect the value of accounts 
payable and other accrued expenses. Current loans include a revolving line of credit of 
$30,000 in the low leverage case, $40,000 for medium leverage and $35,000 for the 
highly leveraged farm. The intermediate loan category covers the loan the operator takes 
out on their machinery, vehicles, and equipment. The value of long-term loans is the 
mortgage on the operator’s farm, the loan used to purchase cattle, and the loan for the 
squeeze chute and pen system. The low leverage farm was purchased in 1993 for $346 
per acre, the medium leverage farm was purchased in 2003 for $847 per acre, and the 
high leverage farm was purchased in 2013 for $1,723 per acre (OSU 2018). Land 
purchase values are from the Oklahoma State University Extension Agricultural Land 
Values page. The low leverage farm and medium leverage farms have $90,000 and 
$80,000 of personal liabilities, respectively, while the high leverage case has $0. Finally, 
the farm incurs $10,000 of hired labor each year. The specific values for current 
liabilities, current loans, personal liabilities, land purchase years, and hired labor at each 













Table 3.2: Cow-Calf Farm Beginning Balance Sheet Summaries 
COW-CALF FARM 
Low Leverage Medium Leverage High Leverage 
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The baseline representative diversified operation has 444 acres of cropland and 
3000 acres for a cow-calf operation. The 444 acres of cropland are owned in addition to 
444 acres of owned pastureland for the cow-calf operation. The remaining 2,556 acres of 
pastureland are leased at a rate of $11.75 per acre (USDA NASS 2017e). A conception 
rate of 87.3 percent and a death loss rate of 4.2 percent is used, leaving 251 calves to sell 
each year (OSU 2017). Calves are sold at 525 pounds (OSU 2017) for $149.78 per 
hundredweight, immediately after they are weaned. The sale price is the average annual 
steer and heifer calf price for 2007 to 2016 from the Livestock Marketing Information 
Center. 
Assets and liabilities for each leverage position are detailed in table 3.3. 
Beginning current assets are $80,000 for the low leverage producer, $40,000 for the 
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medium leverage producer and $80,000 for the higher leverage producer. Current assets 
include the value of cash and checking accounts and prepaid expenses and supplies. The 
operation, at each leverage position, has $203,373 of livestock held for sale, representing 
251 calves sold for a total of $197,373, 30 cull cows (10 percent cull rate) sold for $175 
per head, and 5 cull bulls (50 percent cull rate) sold for $150 per head at the beginning of 
the simulation. A total of $868,305 of intermediate assets are held. The diversified farm, 
at each leverage position, utilizes a tractor, planter, seed drill, front-end loader, feed 
truck, pickup truck, and a livestock trailer.  
Long term assets include the value of owned land and the value of buildings and 
improvements. A market-value based balance sheet is used to better reflect the changing 
values of land in the simulation. Land prices come from the Oklahoma State University 
Land Values website (OSU 2018). In the low and medium leverage cases, the value of 
the land is greater than the purchase price of the land. Additionally, the farm owns a 
working pen system with a squeeze chute that was financed at purchase that are included 
in the value of long-term assets. The farm operator holds $260,000 of personal assets in 
the low and medium leverage cases, and $330,000 in the high leverage case. The specific 
values for current assets, cull cows and bulls, buildings and improvements, and personal 
assets at each leverage position are arbitrarily chosen to achieve the desired year zero 
debt-to-asset ratio. 
Current liabilities are $50,000 in the low leverage case, $80,000 for medium 
leverage and $60,000 for high leverage. Current liabilities reflect the value of accounts 
payable and other accrued expenses. Current loans include a revolving line of credit of 
$30,000 in the low leverage case, $40,000 for medium leverage and $30,000 for the 
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highly leveraged farm. The intermediate loan category covers the loan the operator takes 
out on their machinery, vehicles, and equipment. The value of long-term loans is the 
mortgage on the operator’s farm, the loan used to purchase cattle, and the loan for the 
squeeze chute and pen system.  
The cropland for the low leverage farm was purchased in 1993 for $530 per acre, 
the cropland for the medium leverage farm was purchased in 2003 for $714 per acre, and 
cropland for the high leverage farm was purchased in 2013 for $1,955 per acre. The 
pastureland for the low leverage farm was purchased in 1993 for $346 per acre, the 
pastureland for the medium leverage farm was purchased in 2003 for $847 per acre, and 
the pastureland for the high leverage farm was purchased in 2013 for $1,723 per acre. 
Land purchase values are from the Oklahoma State University Extension Agricultural 
Land Values page (OSU 2018).  
The low leverage farm and medium leverage farms have $90,000 and $100,000 of 
personal liabilities respectively. The low and medium leverage farms also hold $35,485 
and $67,743 of personal loans respectively. Finally, the farm incurs $10,000 of hired 
labor each year. The specific values for current liabilities, current loans, personal 
liabilities, personal loans, land purchase years, and hired labor at each leverage position 








Table 3.3: Diversified Farm Beginning Balance Sheet Summaries 
Diversified Farm 
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Before the first year of the model projections (non-stochastic simulation), the low 
leveraged farms had a debt to asset ratio of 20 percent, the medium leverage farms had a 
debt to asset ratio of 40 percent and the high leveraged farms had a debt to asset ratio of 
60 percent, adapting part of the method used by Nutt and Skees (1990). Each leverage 
position was based off the Oklahoma Cooperative Extension Farm and Ranch Stress Test 
(Doye 2014). To achieve the various leverage positions, the amount of assets is 
decreased, and liabilities increased to move from the low leverage position to the high 
leverage position.  
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First, budgets for each crop and livestock enterprise were created in FINPACK 
(FINPACK 2018) using information from Oklahoma State University Sample Enterprise 
Budgets (OSU 2017). Data from the 2017 Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics book are used 
to determine the average acreage of an Oklahoma farm (ODAFF 2017). Furthermore, 
data from NASS are used to determine the 10-year average price for various crops, 
livestock, and land rents (USDA NASS 2017a; USDA NASS 2017b; USDA NASS 
2017c). Next, balance sheets were created in FINPACK for each of the nine baseline 
scenarios.  
Baseline Simulations 
Financial performance information for each scenario was projected, or 
“simulated”, 10 years forward using FINPACK’s FINFLO feature to evaluate their 
financial standing at the end of the simulation. FINFLO takes information given in the 
balance sheet and uses it as the year one beginning balance sheet. After the user enters 
factors including the cropping mix for the year, sale price, and yield, FINFLO takes 
information from the budgets to make the necessary calculations. Finally, FINFLO 
combines the information it is given and the calculations of cash inflows and outflows 
based on the budgets to generate an ending balance sheet for the year. This ending 
balance sheet is used as the beginning balance sheet for the next year. 
Next, the simulations are run again imposing a two-year period of price shocks 
using crop and cattle prices from market reports on January 12, 2018, ceteris paribus. 
The prices for years one and two are amended to reflect the January 12th prices, with the 
prices in years three through 10 remaining at the 10-year average level. The prices in 
years one and two are changed to $3.58 per bushel for wheat, $8.78 per bushel for 
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soybeans, $3.32 per bushel for corn (USDA NASS 2018), and $146.31 per 
hundredweight for cattle (Market Report 2018 (USDA AMS data)). 
Finally, a four-year period of price shocks was imposed using crop and cattle 
prices from market reports on January 12, 2018, ceteris paribus. The prices for years one 
through four are amended to reflect the January 12th prices, with the prices in years five 
through 10 remaining at the 10-year average level. At the end of the 10-year simulations, 
measures of liquidity, solvency, profitability, and debt repayment capacity are evaluated 
to better understand the causes, nature, and potential extent of farm financial stress, and 
more importantly, what factors most influence farm financial performance. The main 
focus of these financial measures was the debt-to-asset ratio following Jolly et al. (1985).  
In evaluating the results of the baseline simulations, any crop and diversified farm 
scenarios where the year 10 debt-to-asset ratio is greater than the year one debt-to-asset 
ratio is re-evaluated under six different management scenarios, and any cow-calf farm 
scenarios where the year 10 debt-to-asset ratio is greater than the year one debt-to-asset 
ratio is re-evaluated under four different management scenarios, adapting the work of 
Doye and Jolly (1987), and Zhang and Tidgren (2018). Each of the six management 
scenarios represented a management decision or strategy that could be easily made and 
implemented by a farm manager as a means to lessen the effects of farm financial stress.    
Management Scenario One 
 The first management scenario was used to evaluate the role input costs play in 
financial stress. To create this scenario, new budgets were created for each of the three 
enterprises. A 10 percent cut to input costs was imposed to each of the farms. On the crop 
farm, original direct expenses were $151.06 per acre for soybeans, $225.00 per acre for 
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corn, and $210.00 per acre for wheat. Total direct expenses were $517.22 per head for the 
cow-calf farm. Total original direct expenses on the diversified farm combine the direct 
expenses of the crop farm and cow-calf farm. New direct expenses are $135.96 per acre 
for soybeans, $202.50 per acre for corn, and $188.01 per acre for wheat. Total new direct 
expenses were $465.49 per head for the cow-calf farm. Total new direct expenses on the 
diversified farm combine the direct expenses of the crop farm and cow-calf farm.  
Management Scenario Two 
 The second management scenario involved changing the cropping patterns and 
selling a portion of owned land and leasing it back. The crop farm planted all their 444 
acres to wheat instead of planting multiple crops for all 10 years of the simulation. The 
cow-calf farm sells one-quarter of their pastureland at the current market rate of $1,969 
per acre (OSU 2018), then leases it back at a rate of $11.75 per acre (USDA NASS 
2017e). The diversified farm changed their cropping pattern, planting all their 444 acres 
to wheat instead of planting multiple crops for all 10 years of the simulation and sells 
one-quarter of their pastureland at the current market rate of $1,969 per acre (OSU 2018), 
then leased it back at a rate of $11.75 per acre (USDA NASS 2017e). The crop farm did 
not sell any of its owned land. 
Management Scenario Three 
 The third management scenario also involved changing the cropping patterns and 
selling a portion of owned land and leasing it back. The crop farm planted a 50/50 mix of 
wheat and soybeans (222 acres of wheat and 222 acres of soybeans). The cow-calf farm 
sold one-half of their pastureland at the current market rate of $1,969 per acre (OSU 
2018), then leased it back at a rate of $11.75 per acre (USDA NASS 2017e). The 
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diversified farm changed their cropping pattern, planting 222 acres to wheat and 222 
acres to soybeans for all 10 years of the simulation, and sold one-half of their pastureland 
at the current market rate of $1,969 per acre (OSU 2018), then leased it back at a rate of 
$11.75 per acre (USDA NASS 2017e). The crop farm did not sell any of its owned land. 
Management Scenario Four 
The fourth management scenario only applied to the crop farm and the diversified 
farm. The crop farm planted all their 444 acres to wheat for years one and two of the 
simulation and returned to planting an even mix of all three crops in years three through 
10 of the simulation. The diversified farm changed their cropping pattern, planting all 
their 444 acres to wheat for years one and two of the simulation and return to planting an 
even mix of all three crops in years three through 10 of the simulation, and sold one-
quarter of their pastureland at the current market rate of $1,969 per acre (OSU 2018), 
then leased it back at a rate of $11.75 per acre (USDA NASS 2017e). The crop farm did 
not sell any of its owned land. 
Management Scenario Five 
The fifth management scenario also only applied to the crop farm and the 
diversified farm. The crop farm planted a 50/50 mix of wheat and soybeans (222 acres of 
wheat and 222 acres of soybeans) for years one and two of the simulation and returned to 
planting an even mix of all three crops in years three through 10 of the simulation. The 
diversified farm changed their cropping pattern, planting a 50/50 mix of wheat and 
soybeans (222 acres of wheat and 222 acres of soybeans) for years one and two of the 
simulation and return to planting an even mix of all three crops in years three through 10 
of the simulation, and sold one-half of their pastureland at the current market rate of 
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$1,969 per acre (OSU 2018), then leased it back at a rate of $11.75 per acre (USDA 
NASS 2017e). The crop farm did not sell any of its owned land. 
Management Scenario Six 
 Management scenario six is an asset management scenario. In this scenario 
machinery is sold off and replaced at a rate of 10 percent per year. The goal of this 
management scenario is to smooth the cash flow effects of a wholesale replacement of 
machinery and vehicles in year five from the baseline scenario. The farm operator takes 
out a new machinery loan in year five for 50 percent of the total value of the machinery 
compliment (since they have already “replaced” 50 percent of the machinery). When the 
new machinery loan is taken out, the interest rate is increased to 5.75 percent, this 
assumes that the interest rate increases a ½ percentage point per year. In this scenario, 
trucks and other vehicles are not replaced.  
 The total value of machinery on the crop farm is $327,473, making the annual 
replacement value $32,747.30 per year. The value of the new loan in year five was 
$163,736.50. On the cow-calf farm, the total value of machinery is $9,387, making the 
annual replacement value $938.70 per year. The value of the new loan in year five was 
$4,693.50. The total value of machinery on the diversified farm is $336,860, making the 
annual replacement value $33,686 per year. The value of the new loan in year five was 
$168,430. 
Since machinery is being kept on farm longer, the cost of repairs and maintenance 
was assumed to be explicitly increased $500.00 per year for each piece of machinery and 
vehicle. The crop farm and cow-calf farm both utilized four pieces, making their annual 
cost of repairs and maintenance increased by $2,000 per year in this scenario. The 
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diversified farm held seven pieces of equipment making their annual cost of repairs and 
maintenance increased by $3,500 per year. 
Simulation Results 
The results from all simulations were evaluated using the same set of criteria 
taken from Doye (2014). The liquidity measure (current ratio) was be considered green 
zone if it was greater than or equal to 2.0, yellow zone if the current ratio was 1.1 to 1.9, 
and red zone if the current ratio was less than or equal to 1.0.  The debt-to-asset ratio 
(solvency measure) was be considered green zone if it was less than or equal to 30 
percent, yellow zone if the debt-to-asset ratio was 31 percent to 59 percent, and red zone 
if the debt-to-asset ratio was greater than or equal to 60 percent.  
Adapting the research of Doye and Jolly (1987), if a farm reached greater than or 
equal to a 100 percent debt-to-asset ratio at any time during the simulation, they were 
considered “technically insolvent” (Doye and Jolly 1987). However, these farms 
remained in consideration because if the farm operator was able to secure external cash to 
cover term debts, the possibility existed that they would weather a period of insolvency. 
In analyzing the results, a farm was be considered “financially stressed” when the debt-
to-asset ratio was greater than or equal to 40 percent (Jolly et al. 1985; Doye 2014; Burns, 
Tulman, and Harris 2015). 
Farm profitability is evaluated using the rate of return on equity. Profitability will 
be considered “good”/green zone if it is greater than or equal to 10 percent, “fair”/yellow 
zone if the rate of return on equity is 5.1 percent to 9.9 percent, and “poor”/red zone if the 
rate of return on equity is less than or equal to 5 percent. Finally, debt repayment capacity 
will be considered green zone if the term debt coverage ratio was greater than or equal to 
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1.35, yellow zone if the term debt coverage ratio was 1.11 to 1.34, red zone if it was less 
than or equal to 1.10. After imposing the management scenarios, the financial measures 
of all simulations were compared. The debt-to-asset ratio was the main focus of the 




 Based on the objectives of this study, the expectations of this research are: 
1. Sustained low commodity prices will increase the degree of financial stress. 
2. Farms that carry a greater amount of debt will be less likely to reduce their degree 
of financial stress in the 10-year simulation. 
3. Farms that include a livestock component will have a lower degree of financial 
stress through periods of low commodity output prices. 
4. Management strategies exist that will be successful in moving a farm business 
through a period of financial stress. 
The results of this study will be compared to these expectations to evaluate what factors 










The three sets of baseline scenarios are used to establish a foundation for these 
“average” farms. The first baseline scenario used the 10-year average prices and three-
year average yields for all 10 years of the simulations.  
Baseline Scenario Crop Farm 
For the baseline crop farm, liquidity concerns were constantly present in the 
medium and high leverage cases (table 4.1). The medium leverage farm did reach yellow 
zone liquidity in years five through seven, with a high of 1.6 in year six. The situation is 
more variable when solvency is evaluated. The low leverage crop farm had a debt-to-
asset ratio of zero percent by year 10, with a temporary high of 34.3 percent in year five. 
The medium and low leverage farms both end the simulation more solvent than they 
began, with the debt-to-asset ratio decreasing 27.4 percentage points in the medium 
leverage case and 12 percentage points in the low leverage case. However, the high 
leverage farm becomes technically insolvent in year six. As a result, the high leverage 
farm was simulated using the parameters defined in the six management scenarios. The 
crop farm had yellow zone profitability for five and seven years in the low and medium 
leverage cases respectively. The high leverage farm had three years of green zone 
profitability, with a high of 28.1 percent in year four, but the remaining years were in the 
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red zone. The crop farm’s repayment capacity was the most variable. The low and 
medium leverage farms each had four years of green zone debt repayment. The high 
leverage scenario had only one year of green zone debt repayment capacity.  
Baseline Scenario Cow-Calf Farm 
The liquidity of the cow-calf farm was like that of the crop farm except that the 
medium leverage farm did not have any years of green or yellow zone liquidity (table 
4.2). Over the ten years of the simulation, the solvency of the low and medium leverage 
farms improved 10 percentage points, and 16.4 percentage points respectively. The low 
leverage farm ended with a zero percent debt-to-asset ratio and the medium leverage farm 
ended 16.4 percentage points lower by year 10. However, the debt-to-asset ratio of the 
high leverage farm increased 4.5 percentage points. As a result, the high leverage farm 
was simulated using the parameters defined in the six management scenarios. No 
leverage position reached technical insolvency in the simulation. The cow-calf operation 
had profitability issues at each leverage position. The low and high leverage farms each 
had one year of green zone profitability, and the medium leverage farm had two years. 
This could be due to the markedly higher value of the assets owned by the cow-calf farm 
as compared to the crop farm. The cow-calf farm’s debt repayment capacity was just as 
variable as the crop farm. The low leverage farm had eight years of green zone repayment 
capacity, the medium leverage farm had five years, but the high leverage farm had zero 
years of green or yellow zone repayment capacity.  
Baseline Scenario Diversified Farm 
The diversified farm showed better results than the previous two farms (table 4.3). 
The diversified farm combined the crop and cow-calf operations, giving the diversified 
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farm a larger asset base on which to operate. There were no liquidity issues in the low 
leverage scenario (the year one current ratio is in the yellow zone), and serious liquidity 
issues in the medium and high leverage cases, with all 10 years being in the red zone for 
both cases. The solvency of low and medium leverage scenarios improved 7.5 percent 
and 18.8 percent from beginning to end respectively. The low leverage farm decreased its 
debt-to-asset ratio by 7.5 percentage points and the medium leverage farm decreased 18.8 
percentage points. However the high leverage farm had a year 10 debt-to-asset ratio 4.1 
percentage points higher than year one. As a result, the high leverage farm was simulated 
using the parameters defined in the six management scenarios. No leverage position 
reached technical insolvency in the simulation. The low and medium leverage farms had 
yellow zone profitability all ten years of the simulation (the year one rate of return on 
equity for the medium leverage farm was in the green zone). The high leverage farm had 
yellow zone profitability three out of ten years with the remaining seven being in the red 
zone. The repayment capacity of the farm was in the green zone beginning in year three 
for the low leverage scenario. The medium leverage farm had two years of green zone 
repayment capacity and five years of yellow zone repayment capacity. The high leverage 
case never had any green or yellow zone repayment capacity. 
 
Two-Year Price Shock Scenarios 
 
The second baseline scenario imposed the prices from January 12, 2018 on each 
example farm during years 1 and 2, then returned to the 10-year average price in years 3 
through 10.  
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Table 4.1: Baseline Scenario Crop Farm Simulation Results 
Years   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Low 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.3 7.3 15.6 20.5 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.7 2.6 n/a 
D/A Ratio 12.0% 2.4% 1.6% 0.9% 34.3% 29.8% 24.3% 17.5% 9.1% 0.0% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
3.6% 9.6% 5.7% 6.3% 3.4% 2.9% 4.0% 5.0% 5.8% 6.5% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
1.02 13.07 8.76 8.88 4.32 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.77 
Medium 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.1 1.6 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.8 
D/A Ratio 39.9% 35.9% 30.8% 24.6% 52.6% 41.1% 35.5% 27.8% 19.8% 12.5% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
4.6% 6.5% 7.7% 8.8% 4.6% 17.6% 5.2% 6.5% 7.6% 8.4% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
1.21 0.57 6.52 7.11 3.87 1.36 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.66 
High 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 87.2% 88.5% 89.4% 89.7% 99.5% 103.0% 106.1% 108.9% 111.3% 113.4% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
1.5% 10.9% 19.3% 28.1% -3.2% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 













Table 4.2: Baseline Scenario Cow-Calf Farm Simulation Results 
Years  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Low 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 1.1 7.7 10.7 12.9 12.0 13.3 14.4 15.3 16.0 n/a 
D/A Ratio 10.0% 2.2% 1.5% 0.7% 5.1% 4.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
8.3% 10.4% 8.3% 8.2% 7.5% 7.2% 7.0% 6.9% 6.7% 6.6% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
1.07 1.16 6.76 7.13 7.16 4.33 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38 
Medium 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
D/A Ratio 34.6% 30.4% 28.6% 26.7% 28.5% 25.2% 23.5% 21.8% 20.0% 18.2% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
10.5% 9.4% 9.4% 9.3% 8.5% 10.4% 8.0% 7.9% 7.9% 7.8% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
1.03 0.65 0.69 0.65 2.80 2.27 1.66 1.65 1.64 1.63 
High 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.1% 65.0% 65.3% 65.5% 67.3% 67.9% 68.3% 68.8% 69.2% 69.6% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
12.7% 9.1% 9.4% 9.7% 8.6% 8.4% 8.7% 9.0% 9.2% 9.4% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 













Table 4.3: Baseline Scenario Diversified Farm Simulation Results 
Years  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Low 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 1.1 2.1 3.7 5.0 5.0 5.4 5.8 6.2 7.0 25.3 
D/A Ratio 8.3% 4.3% 3.2% 2.1% 11.2% 9.1% 7.0% 4.9% 2.8% 0.8% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
7.5% 6.6% 6.8% 6.8% 5.9% 5.6% 5.6% 5.7% 5.6% 5.6% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
1.04 1.08 5.00 5.19 4.35 2.21 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.45 
Medium 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 
D/A Ratio 29.6% 27.1% 25.3% 22.3% 26.9% 24.1% 21.0% 17.8% 14.4% 10.8% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
10.3% 6.9% 7.1% 7.3% 6.3% 6.2% 6.4% 6.5% 6.6% 6.7% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
1.15 0.60 0.88 1.07 2.72 1.29 1.29 1.28 1.28 1.35 
High 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 63.5% 63.4% 63.4% 63.2% 67.0% 67.3% 67.6% 67.7% 67.7% 67.6% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
4.6% 3.9% 4.5% 5.0% 3.3% 3.4% 4.1% 4.6% 5.1% 5.6% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 






Two-Year Price Shock Crop Farm 
When the two years of price shocks were applied to the crop farm, the results 
were in general financially worse than the base scenario (table 4.4). Only one year of 
green zone liquidity existed with no green zone current ratios in the medium and high 
leverage cases. A 35 percentage point increase in the debt-to-asset ratio occurred between 
years four and five (the year of equipment replacement) for the low leverage farm, but it 
ended the simulation with a 0 percent debt-to-asset ratio. Similarly, in the medium 
leverage farm, a 17 percentage point increase was observed between years four and five, 
with the debt-to-asset ratio ending lower than in year one, however still above the 
“financially stressed” threshold. The debt-to-asset ratio for the high leverage case was 
94.9 percent at the end of year one, and reached technical insolvency by year two. As a 
result, the high leverage farm was simulated using the parameters defined in the six 
management scenarios.  
Profitability in the low leverage case only achieved a yellow zone position, the 
medium leverage farm had three years of green zone profitability, and the high leverage 
case had one year. Inadequate debt repayment capacity existed at all leverage positions. 
The low leverage case had four years where debt obligations could be met comfortably 
by internal cash flow. The highest term debt coverage ratio was 8.28 in year four 
meaning the farm could service over 800 percent of its term debt with internal cash flow. 
The medium leverage farm had three years of green zone and one year of yellow zone 
repayment capacity. The high leverage farm had only one year in which debt obligations 




Two-Year Price Shock Cow-Calf Farm 
Liquidity of the cow-calf farm was marginally better than the crop farm in the low 
and medium leverage positions (table 4.5). The low leverage case had eight years of 
green zone liquidity. Solvency for the low leverage case ended the simulation with a 0 
percent debt-to-asset ratio. The medium leverage case ended with a 15.5 percentage point 
lower debt-to-asset ratio, and the high leverage simulation ends with a higher ratio than 
the first year, but did not reach technical insolvency. As a result, the high leverage farm 
was simulated using the parameters defined in the management scenarios. At each 
leverage position, there was one year of green zone profitability with the remaining nine 
years being in the yellow zone. The low leverage farm had strong repayment capacity 
starting in year three, medium leverage starting in year five, and high leverage never 
showed a repayment capacity in the green or yellow zone.  
Two-Year Price Shock Diversified Farm 
The diversified farm’s liquidity mirrored that of the cow-calf farm (table 4.6). The 
low leverage case showed seven years of green zone liquidity and one year of yellow 
zone liquidity. Both the medium and high leverage cases were in the red zone for all 10 
years. The low and medium leverage cases improved their solvency from year one to year 
10. The solvency of the high leverage case increased from 65 percent in year one to 72.5 
percent in year 10, an increase of 7.5 percentage points. As a result, the high leverage 
farm was simulated using the parameters defined in the management scenarios. 
Profitability for each leverage case never reached a green zone position, but the low and 
medium leverage cases each had nine years of yellow zone profitability while the high 
leverage case only had two years of yellow zone profitability with the remaining eight 
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years being in the red zone. The low leverage case showed eight years of green zone 
repayment capacity, the medium leverage case showed one year of green zone and five 
years of yellow zone repayment capacity, and the high leverage case had no years of 
green or yellow zone repayment capacity. 
 
Four-Year Price Shock Scenario 
 
The third baseline scenario imposed the prices from January 12, 2018 on each 
product during years 1 through 4, then returned to the 10-year average price in years 5 
through 10. 
Four-Year Price Shock Crop Farm 
In the four-year price shock scenario, the outlook for the crop farm was bleak 
(table 4.7). No current ratio existed that is outside the red zone. The solvency of the 
business deteriorated in each leverage case. The debt-to-asset ratio ended three 
percentage points higher in the low leverage case, 20 percentage points higher in the 
medium leverage case, and 73 percentage points higher for the high leverage case. The 
high leverage farm reached technical insolvency in year two. As a result, all three 
leverage cases were simulated using the parameters defined in the management scenarios. 
The low leverage case showed four years of yellow zone profitability, and the medium 
leverage farm had three years of green zone profitability, but large negative returns on 
equity ratios existed in each leverage case. The same situation existed for debt repayment 
capacity. The low leverage case had one year of green zone repayment capacity while the 
medium and high leverage cases only had one year of yellow zone repayment capacity at 
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best. For each leverage case, the farm would be forced to borrow money to cover other 
debt obligations. 
Four-Year Price Shock Cow-Calf Farm 
The cow-calf farm presents a different picture, most likely because the current 
price for cattle was not considerably lower than the ten-year average price (table 4.8). 
The low leverage case had a green zone current ratio each year except the first, but the 
medium and high leverage cases never had a current ratio outside the red zone. Solvency 
improved 10.1 percentage points in the low leverage case, 14.8 percentage points in the 
medium leverage case, but deteriorated by 5.8 percentage points in the high leverage 
case. As a result, the high leverage farm was simulated using the parameters defined in 
the management scenarios. The profitability picture was positive in each leverage case. 
Each leverage position experienced one year of green zone profitability, with the 
remaining nine years being in the yellow zone. Debt repayment capacity was in the green 
zone for eight years in the low leverage case and six years in the medium leverage case 
(with one year of yellow zone repayment capacity in the low leverage case). The high 
leverage simulation continually had red zone debt repayment capacity.  
Four-Year Price Shock Diversified Farm 
The results from the diversified farm resembled those of the cow-calf farm from 
above (table 4.9). The low leverage case had six years of green zone current ratios and 
one year with a yellow zone current ratio. Liquidity in the medium and high leverage 
cases was persistently in the red zone. Solvency improved 7.6 percentage points in the 
low leverage case and 9.7 percentage points in the medium leverage case, but increased 
11.8 percentage points in the high leverage case. As a result, the high leverage farm was  
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Table 4.4: Crop Farm, Two-Year Price Shock Scenario Simulation Results 
Years  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Low 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.0 2.2 1.8 1.4 1.0 0.8 n/a 
D/A Ratio 19.9% 18.0% 11.6% 3.9% 39.1% 34.4% 28.3% 20.6% 11.0% 0.0% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-5.7% 0.6% 6.0% 7.1% 3.9% 3.6% 4.9% 6.1% 7.0% 7.7% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.35 3.68 7.94 8.28 4.19 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.75 
Medium 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 
D/A Ratio 48.0% 53.4% 50.3% 46.2% 63.4% 54.0% 51.9% 48.9% 45.2% 40.6% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-9.4% -9.5% 8.8% 10.4% 4.6% 24.3% 6.0% 7.6% 8.9% 10.0% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.54 -0.13 5.74 6.26 3.24 1.32 0.59 0.56 0.54 0.56 
High 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 94.9% 105.3% 108.1% 110.4% 116.4% 121.9% 127.2% 132.3% 137.3% 142.0% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-71.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 













Table 4.5: Cow-Calf Farm, Two-Year Price Shock Scenario Simulation Results 
Years  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Low 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 1.0 6.5 9.5 11.8 11.2 12.5 13.6 14.5 15.3 n/a 
D/A Ratio 10.1% 2.2% 1.5% 0.7% 5.1% 4.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
7.7% 10.2% 8.4% 8.2% 7.6% 7.2% 7.1% 6.9% 6.8% 6.6% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
1.00 1.12 6.73 7.11 7.15 4.33 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38 
Medium 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
D/A Ratio 34.8% 31.3% 29.5% 27.6% 29.4% 26.1% 24.5% 22.8% 21.1% 19.3% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
9.6% 9.1% 9.4% 9.3% 8.5% 10.5% 8.0% 8.0% 7.9% 7.8% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.96 0.61 0.68 0.65 2.78 2.26 1.64 1.63 1.62 1.61 
High 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.4% 65.8% 66.1% 66.3% 68.2% 68.7% 69.2% 69.7% 70.2% 70.6% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
11.3% 8.5% 9.5% 9.8% 8.7% 8.5% 8.9% 9.1% 9.4% 9.5% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 













Table 4.6: Diversified Farm, Two-Year Price Shock Scenario Simulation Results 
Years  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Low 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.7 0.5 1.7 3.2 3.8 4.3 4.7 5.1 5.9 21.5 
D/A Ratio 8.5% 5.4% 3.3% 2.2% 11.6% 9.5% 7.3% 5.1% 2.9% 0.8% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
5.4% 4.8% 6.9% 7.0% 6.1% 5.8% 5.9% 5.9% 5.8% 5.8% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.76 0.66 4.88 5.15 4.35 2.21 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.45 
Medium 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
D/A Ratio 30.7% 31.1% 29.5% 26.7% 31.2% 28.6% 25.8% 22.8% 19.6% 16.3% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
7.4% 4.4% 7.3% 7.4% 6.4% 6.3% 6.5% 6.6% 6.7% 6.8% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.90 0.35 0.84 1.03 2.62 1.24 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.28 
High 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.0% 66.8% 66.9% 67.0% 70.7% 71.3% 71.8% 72.1% 72.4% 72.5% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-0.1% -0.7% 4.4% 5.0% 3.2% 3.2% 3.9% 4.6% 5.2% 5.7% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




simulated using the parameters defined in the management scenarios. Profitability was in 
the yellow zone for eight years in the low leverage case, seven years in the medium 
leverage farm and two years in the high leverage run. Debt repayment capacity was green 
zone for eight years in the low leverage case and one year in the medium leverage case 
(with five years of yellow zone repayment capacity in the medium leverage case). The 
high leverage simulation continually had red zone debt repayment capacity.  
 
Pre-Management Scenarios Summary 
   
In total 11 of the baseline farm cases were put through the management scenario 
simulations, recall, management scenario simulations were conducted if the farm had a 
greater debt-to-asset ratio in year 10 than it had in year one. Specifically, farm that met 
this criteria included: high leverage baseline crop farm, high leverage baseline cow-calf 
farm, high leverage baseline diversified farm, high leverage two-year price shock crop 
farm, high leverage two-year price shock cow-calf farm, high leverage two-year price 
shock diversified farm, low leverage four-year price shock crop farm, medium leverage 
four-year price shock crop farm, high leverage four-year price shock crop farm, high 





Table 4.7: Crop Farm, Four-Year Price Shock Scenario Simulation Results  
Years  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Low 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 
D/A Ratio 19.9% 18.0% 20.5% 23.2% 45.2% 42.4% 38.9% 34.5% 29.2% 22.9% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-5.7% 0.6% -4.4% -4.0% 3.7% 4.1% 5.6% 6.8% 7.9% 8.8% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.35 3.68 -1.26 -1.38 3.75 0.67 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.66 
Medium 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 48.0% 53.4% 59.3% 65.7% 78.9% 71.5% 71.5% 71.0% 69.8% 67.9% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-9.4% -9.5% -10.5% -11.7% 5.5% 36.8% 6.2% 9.0% 11.6% 14.1% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.54 -0.13 -1.83 -2.06 0.56 1.21 0.47 0.44 0.45 4.90 
High 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 94.9% 105.3% 116.7% 129.0% 131.6% 138.8% 146.1% 153.4% 160.6% 167.8% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-71.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 













Table 4.8: Cow-Calf Farm, Four-Year Price Shock Scenario Simulation Results 
Years  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Low 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 1.0 6.5 9.1 11.0 10.7 12.0 13.1 14.1 14.9 n/a 
D/A Ratio 10.1% 2.2% 1.5% 0.8% 5.1% 4.1% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
7.7% 10.2% 8.1% 8.0% 7.6% 7.2% 7.1% 7.0% 6.8% 6.7% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
1.00 1.12 6.40 6.75 7.15 4.33 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38 
Medium 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
D/A Ratio 34.8% 31.3% 29.8% 28.2% 30.0% 26.7% 25.1% 23.5% 21.7% 20.0% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
9.6% 9.1% 9.1% 9.0% 8.6% 10.5% 8.0% 8.0% 7.9% 7.8% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.96 0.61 0.65 0.61 2.76 2.25 1.63 1.62 1.61 1.60 
High 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.4% 65.8% 66.3% 66.8% 68.7% 69.3% 69.8% 70.3% 70.7% 71.2% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
11.3% 8.5% 8.8% 9.1% 8.8% 8.6% 8.9% 9.2% 9.4% 9.6% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 













Table 4.9: Diversified Farm, Four-Year Price Shock Scenario Simulation Results 
Years  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Low 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.5 2.7 3.2 3.7 4.1 4.8 18.0 
D/A Ratio 8.5% 5.4% 3.4% 2.3% 12.0% 9.8% 7.5% 5.2% 3.0% 0.9% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
5.4% 4.8% 5.0% 5.2% 6.3% 6.0% 6.1% 6.1% 6.0% 6.0% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.76 0.66 3.38 3.57 4.31 2.21 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.45 
Medium 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0. 1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 30.7% 31.1% 31.4% 30.6% 34.9% 32.5% 29.9% 27.1% 24.1% 21.0% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
7.4% 4.4% 4.6% 4.9% 6.4% 6.4% 6.6% 6.7% 6.9% 6.9% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.90 0.35 0.49 0.66 2.53 1.20 1.19 1.18 1.18 1.23 
High 
Leverage 
Current Ratio 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.0% 66.8% 68.5% 70.3% 74.0% 74.7% 75.4% 75.9% 76.4% 76.8% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-0.1% -0.7% -0.4% -0.1% 3.0% 3.0% 3.8% 4.6% 5.2% 5.9% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 








Management Scenario One 
 
The first management scenario evaluated the impact of trimming production 
costs. Overall input costs were cut by 10 percent for each crop and livestock production 
activity. 
Baseline Farms 
The liquidity for the three tested farms did not change from the original 
simulation (table 4.10). The two most impactful results from the first management 
scenario were in the areas of solvency and profitability. In the original baseline 
simulation, the high leverage crop farm’s debt-to-asset ratio increased 26 percentage 
points and the farm became technically insolvent in year six. Under management scenario 
one, the debt-to-asset ratio of the high leverage crop farm only increased 4.7 percentage 
points and the farm did not become technically insolvent. The debt-to-asset ratio of the 
high leverage cow-calf farm increased 3.7 percentage points and the high leverage 
diversified farm increased 1.5 percentage points. Both increases were smaller when 
compared to the original baseline simulation. The profitability of the high leverage crop 
farm had 10 years of green zone rate of returns on equity compared to one year in the 
baseline. The high leverage diversified farm also improved from three years of yellow 
zone profitability in the original baseline to six years of yellow zone profitability in 
management scenario one. There was no effect on debt repayment capacity. 
Two-Year Price Shock Farms 
The impact of the first management scenario when applied to the farms under a 
two year price shock is minor (table 4.11). The liquidity for the three tested farms did not 
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change from the original simulation. The highly leveraged crop farm showed a debt-to-
asset ratio increase of 25.6 percentage points and still became technically insolvent in 
year two. The high leverage cow-calf farm and diversified farm both ended with better 
debt-to-asset ratios when compared to the original baseline simulations, but were still in a 
red zone solvency position. The profitability results are mixed. The profitability of the 
high leverage crop farm shows no change from the original baseline, while the 
profitability of the high leverage cow-calf farm shows two years of green zone 
profitability and eight years of yellow zone profitability, compared to one year of green 
zone and nine years of yellow zone profitability in the original simulation. The high 
leverage diversified farm also had marginally improved profitability moving from two 
years of yellow zone return on equity in the original runs to five years in this 
management scenario. Debt repayment capacity worsened for the high leverage crop farm 
and remained unchanged for the cow-calf farm and the diversified farm. 
Four-Year Price Shock Farms 
Results for the four-year price shock farms under this management scenario were 
varied (table 4.12). The low leverage crop farm improved its performance in every 
financial measure. Liquidity for the other four cases showed no change. The solvency of 
the low leverage crop farm declined 18.4 percentage points and the medium leverage 
crop farm declined 2.3 percentage points. The debt-to-asset ratios of the remaining three 
farms did not improve. The high leverage crop farm ended with a 144.8 percent debt-to-
asset ratio, the cow-calf farm’s debt-to-asset ratio increased 4.9 percentage points and the 
diversified farm’s debt-to-asset ratio increased 9.1 percentage points. The high leverage 
crop farm became technically insolvent in year two. The medium leverage crop farm 
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added one year of green zone profitability, and the profitability of the high leverage 
diversified farm added one yellow zone year. Debt repayment capacity remains 
unchanged for all farms.   
 
Management Scenario Two 
 
Management scenario two evaluated how a change in cropping pattern and/or a 
sell off of real estate impacts the various farms. The crop and diversified farms planted all 
444 acres to wheat for all 10 years of the simulation. The cow-calf and diversified farms 
sold 111 acres of pastureland and leased it back. 
Baseline Farms 
This management scenario produced disastrous results for the crop farm and 
diversified farm, but the cow-calf farm experienced a small improvement (table 4.13). 
The crop farm was the most affected in this scenario. Liquidity reached zero in year five, 
the debt-to-asset ratio increased by 231.7 percentage points to 333.1 percent by year 10, 
the farm became technically insolvent by the end of year one, and never had a positive 
term debt coverage ratio. The diversified farm experienced one year of yellow zone 
liquidity, but his was most likely due to the cash infusion that comes from the sale of 
pasture land in year one rather than improved performance. The debt-to-asset ratio 
increased 31.7 percentage points in this scenario compared to 4.1 percentage points in the 
original baseline. Both profitability and debt repayment patterns remained unchanged. 
The cow-calf farm benefited the most of the three farm types. The farm had green zone 
liquidity in year one and yellow zone liquidity the next year, but the remaining eight  
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Table 4.10: Management Scenario One, Baseline Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 85.7% 85.3% 84.1% 82.1% 91.9% 93.0% 93.5% 93.2% 92.2% 90.4% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
11.3% 20.3% 25.7% 29.2% 14.0% 21.2% 36.9% 51.4% 60.0% 61.3% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0. 1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.0% 64.9% 65.0% 65.1% 66.9% 67.3% 67.7% 68.1% 68.4% 68.7% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
13.0% 9.3% 9.6% 9.8% 8.8% 8.6% 8.9% 9.1% 9.3% 9.5% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 63.3% 62.9% 62.6% 62.6% 65.8% 65.8% 65.7% 65.5% 65.2% 64.8% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
5.2% 4.5% 5.1% 5.6% 4.0% 4.1% 4.7% 5.3% 5.8% 6.2% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 









Table 4.11: Management Scenario One, Two-Year Price Shock Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 93.4% 102.1% 102.8% 102.8% 108.8% 111.9% 114.5% 116.6% 118.1% 119.0% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-53.5% -227.7% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0. 1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.4% 65.6% 65.8% 65.9% 67.7% 68.2% 68.6% 69.0% 69.3% 69.7% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
11.6% 8.7% 9.7% 10.0% 8.9% 8.7% 9.0% 9.3% 9.5% 9.6% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 64.8% 66.3% 66.2% 66.0% 69.5% 69.8% 69.9% 69.9% 69.8% 69.7% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
0.6% 0.0% 5.1% 5.7% 3.9% 4.0% 4.7% 5.3% 5.9% 6.4% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 









Table 4.12: Management Scenario One, Four-Year Price Shock Farms Simulation Results  




Current Ratio 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 n/a 
D/A Ratio 18.4% 14.6% 15.1% 15.3% 41.9% 36.6% 29.9% 21.6% 11.6% 0.0% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-3.8% 2.5% -2.0% -1.3% 6.0% 6.1% 7.4% 8.4% 9.2% 9.8% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
D/A Ratio 46.5% 50.0% 53.8% 57.8% 71.1% 61.3% 58.5% 54.8% 50.0% 44.2% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-6.6% -5.8% -5.6% -5.2% 9.8% 32.5% 9.6% 11.3% 12.6% 13.7% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 93.4% 102.1% 111.4% 121.4% 124.0% 128.9% 133.4% 137.6% 141.5% 144.8% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-53.5% -227.7% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0. 1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.4% 65.6% 66.1% 66.4% 68.2% 68.7% 69.2% 69.6% 69.9% 70.3% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
11.6% 8.7% 9.0% 9.3% 9.0% 8.7% 9.1% 9.4% 9.6% 9.7% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 64.8% 66.3% 67.8% 69.2% 72.7% 73.2% 73.5% 73.8% 73.9% 73.9% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
0.6% 0.0% 0.4% 0.8% 3.8% 3.9% 4.7% 5.4% 6.0% 6.6% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.52 0.44 0.40 0.37 0.69 0.51 0.47 0.67 0.65 0.64 
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years were in the red zone. The debt-to-asset ratio decreased 4.1 percentage points from 
years one to 10, and the farm realized six years of green zone profitability and four years 
of yellow zone profitability. However, the term debt coverage ratio never roses above 
0.38. 
Two-Year Price Shock Farms 
This management scenario had a similar impact on the two-year price shock farms 
as it did on the baseline farms (table 4.14). The crop farm and diversified farms 
experienced comparable results with poor financial indicators in all sections. Both farms 
became technically insolvent, the crop farm in year one and the diversified farm in year 
10. The debt-to-asset ratio of the crop farm increased 247.4 percentage points to 354.6 
percent by year 10. The debt-to-asset ratio of the diversified farm increased 34.9 
percentage points between year one and year 10. The rate of return on equity was worse 
for the diversified farm in this management scenario than it was in the base simulation, 
and the debt coverage deteriorated for the crop farm between the base simulation and this 
management scenario. Again, the cow-calf farm improved between the base simulation 
and this management scenario. The farm experienced green zone liquidity in year one, 
and yellow zone liquidity the next. The debt-to-asset ratio decreased 3.4 percentage 
points from years 1 to 10, and the farm realized nine years of green zone profitability and 
one year of yellow zone profitability. The term debt coverage ratio reached 0.91 in year 
eight, but was never in the green zone. 
Four-Year Price Shock Farms 
The crop farms at each leverage position showed no improvement in any financial 
measure, and they each became technically insolvent; the low leverage in year five, 
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medium leverage in year three, and high leverage in year one (table 4.15). The diversified 
farm suffered the same fate as the crop farm, and became technically insolvent in year 
eight.  The cow-calf farm still had green zone liquidity in year one, and yellow zone 
liquidity in year two with the remaining eight years in the red zone. The debt-to-asset 
ratio decreased 2.7 percentage points from years 1 to 10. The farm shows seven years of 
green zone profitability and three years of yellow zone profitability. Debt repayment 
capacity was in the red zone all 10 years for the cow-calf farm. 
 
Management Scenario Three 
 
Management scenario three also looked at how a change in cropping pattern 
and/or a sell off of real estate impacted the various farms. The crop and diversified farms 
planted all 222 acres to wheat and 222 acres to soybeans for all 10 years of the 
simulation. The cow-calf and diversified farms sold 222 acres of pastureland and leased it 
back. 
Baseline Farms 
This management scenario produced results similar to management scenario two 
(table 4.16). The financial condition of the crop farm and diversified farm deteriorated 
while the cow-calf farm improved. The crop farm ended with a 234 percent debt-to-asset 
ratio and became technically insolvent in year two. The debt-to-asset ratio of the 
diversified increased 12.4 percentage points by year 10, but stayed below the financially 




Table 4.13: Management Scenario Two, Base Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 101.4% 119.6% 139.9% 162.6% 172.1% 198.1% 227.0% 259.0% 294.3% 333.1% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-193.9% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 2.3 1.4 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.1% 63.0% 60.3% 59.7% 61.5% 61.5% 61.5% 61.4% 61.2% 61.0% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
12.8% 9.5% 10.4% 10.9% 9.9% 9.6% 9.8% 10.0% 10.1% 10.1% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 1.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 65.2% 66.3% 69.1% 71.9% 78.4% 82.0% 85.6% 89.3% 93.1% 96.9% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-2.5% -3.4% -3.3% -3.5% -7.2% -9.5% -11.5% -14.8% -21.3% -38.5% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 











Table 4.14: Management Scenario Two, Two-Year Price Shock Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 107.2% 132.2% 153.9% 178.1% 184.8% 212.2% 242.8% 276.6% 313.8% 354.6% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-456.8% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 2.3 1.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.4% 63.5% 60.9% 60.6% 62.4% 62.4% 62.4% 62.3% 62.2% 62.0% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
11.4% 8.9% 10.6% 11.1% 10.0% 9.7% 10.0% 10.1% 10.2% 10.3% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 66.1% 69.1% 72.0% 75.1% 81.4% 85.2% 89.0% 92.9% 96.9% 101.0% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-6.4% -7.7% -4.1% -4.4% -8.9% -12.3% -15.7% -22.5% -40.5% -196.7% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 












Table 4.15: Management Scenario Two, Four-Year Price Shock Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 32.6% 45.5% 65.4% 88.2% 111.2% 130.7% 152.7% 177.4% 204.9% 235.5% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-22.4% -21.6% -41.9% -85.3% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 60.9% 81.4% 104.9% 131.4% 145.4% 160.2% 185.7% 214.1% 245.6% 280.2% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-36.5% -64.0% -280.9% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 107.2% 132.2% 160.4% 192.2% 196.3% 225.1% 257.1% 292.5% 331.4% 374.1% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-456.8% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 2.3 1.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0. 1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.4% 63.5% 61.2% 61.2% 63.0% 63.0% 63.0% 63.0% 62.9% 62.7% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
11.4% 8.9% 9.9% 10.5% 10.1% 9.8% 10.0% 10.2% 10.3% 10.4% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 66.1% 69.1% 73.4% 77.8% 84.1% 88.0% 92.0% 96.1% 100.2% 104.5% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-6.4% -7.7% -8.8% -10.5% -10.9% -15.6% -21.8% -36.7% -121.1% n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.23 0.16 0.11 0.06 0.21 0.13 0.07 0.04 -0.02 -0.08 
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diversified farms were worse under this management scenario when compared to the 
original baseline. The cow-calf farm had three years of green zone liquidity and one year 
of yellow zone liquidity. The debt-to-asset ratio decreased 13.2 percentage points, taking 
the cow-calf farm from a red zone solvency position to a yellow zone one. The cow-calf 
farm also improved its profitability, going from two years of green zone in the original 
baseline to nine. 
Two-Year Price Shock Farms 
This management scenario had a similar impact on the two-year price shock farms 
as it did on the original baseline farms (table 4.17). The crop farm and diversified farms 
experienced comparable results with poor financial indicators in all of the evaluated 
financial measures. The crop farm became technically insolvent in year one, ending with 
a 252.5 percent debt-to-asset ratio. Both the cow-calf and diversified farms had green 
zone liquidity in years one through three for the cow-calf, and year one for the 
diversified. Similar to the baseline simulation, the debt-to-asset ratio of the cow-calf farm 
decreased 12.5 percentage points from years 1 to 10, which took it from a red zone 
solvency position to a yellow zone one. The cow-calf farm also has nine years of green 
zone profitability and one year of yellow zone profitability. The term debt coverage ratio 
reached 0.91 in year eight, but never reached the good level of 1.3 or greater. 
Four-Year Price Shock Farms 
Results of this management scenario were similar to the results of the second 
management scenario (table 4.18). The crop farms at each leverage position showed no 
improvement in any financial measure. The year 10 debt-to-asset ratio for the low 
leverage crop farm was 127.3 percent, 172.2 percent for the medium leverage crop farm 
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and 268.9 percent for the high leverage crop farm. Each crop farm became technically 
insolvent; the low leverage in year eight, medium leverage in year five, and high leverage 
in year one. The solvency of the diversified farm deteriorated, increasing 18.6 percentage 
points, but did not become insolvent. The cow-calf farm maintained green zone liquidity 
from years one to three, had yellow zone liquidity in year four and the remaining six 
years were in the red zone. The debt-to-asset ratio of the cow-calf farm decreased 11.8 
percentage points from years 1 to 10, and the farm showed nine years of green zone 
profitability with the one remaining year being in the yellow zone. The cow-calf farm’s 
debt repayment capacity was in the red zone all 10 years. 
 
Management Scenario Four 
 
Management scenario four only applied to the crop and diversified farms and 
evaluated how a change in cropping pattern and/or a sell off of real estate impacted the 
various farms. The crop and diversified farms planted all 444 acres to wheat in years one 
and two, and returned to the even mix of corn, wheat and soybeans in years one through 
three. The cow-calf and diversified farms sold 111 acres of pastureland and leased it 
back. 
Baseline Farms 
The crop farm had serious liquidity issues and became technically insolvent in 
year one (table 4.19). The debt-to-asset ratio increased 60.5 percentage points ending at 
161.9 percent in year 10. The measures of profitability and debt repayment capacity both 
declined from the original baseline simulation. The rate of return on equity was  
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Table 4.16: Management Scenario Three, Baseline Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 95.0% 105.6% 117.1% 129.7% 139.4% 155.2% 172.5% 191.4% 211.8% 234.0% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-72.9% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 4.0 3.0 2.1 1.4 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 
D/A Ratio 65.1% 63.1% 60.4% 56.9% 56.4% 55.0% 54.3% 53.6% 52.7% 51.9% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
12.6% 9.3% 10.5% 11.5% 10.9% 10.8% 11.0% 11.1% 11.0% 11.0% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 2.5 1.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 64.4% 63.6% 62.4% 63.2% 68.8% 70.5% 72.1% 73.7% 75.3% 76.8% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
0.7% 0.3% 1.5% 2.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.6% 1.1% 1.5% 2.0% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 











Table 4.17: Management Scenario Three, Two-Year Price Shock Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 100.0% 116.4% 129.2% 143.1% 150.3% 167.4% 186.1% 206.4% 228.6% 252.5% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-158.1% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 3.9 2.9 2.0 1.3 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
D/A Ratio 65.5% 63.6% 60.9% 57.4% 56.9% 55.9% 55.3% 54.6% 53.8% 53.0% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
11.3% 8.7% 10.7% 11.7% 11.1% 11.0% 11.1% 11.2% 11.2% 11.1% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 2.3 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.2% 65.2% 64.8% 66.0% 71.5% 73.4% 75.2% 77.0% 78.8% 80.5% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-2.6% -2.9% 1.5% 2.1% -0.2% -0.5% 0.0% 0.6% 1.0% 1.5% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 












Table 4.18: Management Scenario Three, Four-Year Price Shock Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 25.1% 23.9% 39.0% 50.0% 74.2% 82.8% 92.4% 103.0% 114.6% 127.3% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-12.2% -7.1% -14.9% -18.2% -19.5% -31.5% -55.2% -287.3% n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 53.3% 65.0% 78.1% 92.8% 108.2% 112.2% 125.2% 139.5% 155.2% 172.2% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-19.8% -25.5% -38.3% -77.9% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 100.0% 116.4% 134.7% 154.9% 159.9% 178.2% 198.1% 219.8% 243.4% 268.9% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-158.1% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 3.9 2.9 2.0 1.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
D/A Ratio 65.5% 63.6% 61.1% 57.8% 57.3% 56.6% 55.9% 55.3% 54.5% 53.7% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
11.3% 8.7% 10.0% 11.1% 11.2% 11.1% 11.2% 11.3% 11.3% 11.2% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 2.3 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.2% 65.2% 66.1% 68.6% 74.0% 76.1% 78.1% 80.0% 81.9% 83.8% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-2.6% -2.9% -2.0% -1.7% -0.6% -1.0% -0.5% 0.0% 0.4% 0.9% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.38 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.49 0.35 0.31 0.41 0.37 0.34 
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consistently in the red zone. The term debt coverage ratio was in the red zone for nine 
years, the exception being a term debt coverage ratio of 1.27 in year five putting it in the 
yellow zone. The diversified farm showed a yellow zone liquidity position in year one, 
but the remaining nine years are in the red zone. The debt-to-asset ratio increased 4.5 
percentage points more than it did in the original baseline simulation. The diversified 
farm had five years of yellow zone profitability with the remaining years being in the red 
zone. The debt repayment capacity was in the red zone all 10 years for the diversified 
farm.  
Two-Year Price Shock Farms 
Like the previous results the crop farm had a red zone liquidity position all 10 
years (table 4.20). The debt-to-asset ratio increased by 76.2 percentage points, ending at 
183.4 percent in year 10, and the farm became technically insolvent in year one. The rate 
of return on equity was in the red zone all 10 years and the term debt coverage ratio 
peaked at 1.07 in year five while the remaining nine years were in the red zone. The 
diversified farm sees no change to its liquidity or debt repayment capacity when 
compared to the baseline of this management scenario. The debt-to-asset ratio increased 
7.6 percentage points to 73.7 percent. The diversified farm experiences five years of fair 
profitability. 
Four-Year Price Shock Farms 
This management scenario did not benefit either the crop or diversified farm with 
a four year price shock (table 4.21). The crop farms at each leverage position showed no 
improvement in any financial measure. The year 10 debt-to-asset ratios for each crop 
farm were 108.8 percent in the low leverage crop farm, 153.7 percent for the medium 
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Table 4.19. Management Scenario Four, Baseline Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 101.4% 117.0% 121.0% 124.8% 128.1% 134.9% 141.7% 148.5% 155.3% 161.9% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-193.9% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.2% 65.8% 65.7% 65.5% 69.3% 69.7% 69.8% 69.9% 69.8% 69.7% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-2.5% -2.1% 5.3% 5.9% 4.1% 4.2% 4.9% 5.6% 6.2% 6.7% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.38 0.36 0.58 0.56 0.72 0.52 0.49 0.69 0.67 0.67 
 
 
Table 4.20. Management Scenario Four, Two-Year Price Shock Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 107.2% 129.6% 135.0% 140.3% 140.8% 149.1% 157.5% 166.1% 174.7% 183.4% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-456.8% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 66.1% 68.6% 68.7% 68.6% 72.4% 72.9% 73.3% 73.5% 73.7% 73.7% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-6.4% -6.2% 5.4% 6.0% 4.0% 4.1% 4.9% 5.7% 6.4% 7.0% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.23 0.21 0.57 0.54 0.69 0.50 0.47 0.66 0.64 0.64 
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Table 4.21. Management Scenario Four, Four-Year Price Shock Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 32.6% 45.5% 65.4% 85.2% 95.3% 98.6% 101.7% 104.4% 106.8% 108.8% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-22.4% -21.6% -41.9% -68.9% -3.4% -9.6% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 60.9% 81.4% 104.9% 128.4% 129.4% 128.0% 134.5% 141.0% 147.4% 153.7% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-36.5% -64.0% -280.9% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 107.2% 132.2% 160.4% 189.4% 180.8% 193.8% 207.4% 221.5% 236.2% 251.3% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-456.8% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 
D/A Ratio 66.1% 69.1% 73.4% 77.3% 80.9% 81.9% 82.8% 83.6% 84.3% 84.9% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-6.4% -7.7% -8.8% -8.4% 3.6% 3.7% 5.0% 6.2% 7.3% 8.4% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




leverage, and 251.3 percent for the high leverage farm. Each crop farm became 
technically insolvent; the low leverage in year seven, medium leverage in year three, and 
high leverage in year one. The solvency of the diversified farm deteriorated by 18.8 
percentage points, but the farm did not become insolvent. The term debt coverage ratio of 
low leverage crop farm peaked at 2.28 in one year which was the only year in the green 
zone, the remaining nine years were in the red zone. The diversified farm shows a yellow 
zone level of profitability from years eight through 10. 
 
Management Scenario Five 
 
Management scenario five only applied to the crop and diversified farms and 
looked at how a change in cropping pattern and/or a sell off of real estate impacted the 
various farms. The crop and diversified farms planted 222 acres to wheat and 222 acres to 
soybeans in years one and two, and returned to the even mix of corn, wheat and soybeans 
in years one through three. The cow-calf and diversified farms sold 222 acres of 
pastureland and leased it back. 
Baseline Farms 
 The crop farm had serious liquidity issues and became technically insolvent in 
year two (table 4.22). The debt-to-asset ratio of the crop farm increased 46.3 percentage 
points to 141.3 percent at the end of year 10. The rate of return on equity reached -3,724 
percent in year 10. There was one year of green zone debt repayment capacity. The 
diversified farm showed improvement in each financial category with the exception of 
the debt repayment capacity. Liquidity in year one was in the green zone (2.5 current 
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ratio) and yellow zone in year two, with the remaining eight years in the red zone. The 
debt-to-asset ratio decreased 3.4 percentage points over the ten years ending at 61 
percent.  
Two-Year Price Shock Farms 
Like the previous results, the crop farm had liquidity issues and became 
technically insolvent in year one (table 4.23). The debt-to-asset ratio by the end of year 
one was already 100 percent and eventually increased 59.8 percentage points over the 10 
years. Debt repayment capacity reached its highest level in year five at 1.29 which was 
still only a yellow zone position, worse than the original simulation where it was in a 
green zone positon. The diversified farm showed improvement in each financial category 
except the debt repayment capacity. Liquidity was green zone in year one and yellow 
zone in year two, but the remaining eight years were in the red zone. The diversified farm 
reduced its debt-to-asset ratio only marginally (0.6 percentage points). Profitability for 
the diversified farm was in the yellow zone seven out of 10 years. 
Four-Year Price Shock Farms 
This management scenario did not benefit the crop farm with a four-year price 
shock (table 4.24). The crop farms at each leverage position showed no improvement in 
any financial measure. The debt-to-asset ratios of each crop farm increases over the 10 
years 33.9 percentage points for the low leverage, 50.6 percentage points for the medium 
leverage, and 102.7 percentage points for the high leverage. The medium and high 
leverage cases became technically insolvent; the medium leverage in year eight, and the 
high leverage in year one. The low leverage crop farm moved from a green zone solvency 
position (25.1 percent debt-to-asset ratio) to a high yellow zone (59 percent debt-to-asset 
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ratio) position by the end of year 10. The solvency of the diversified farm deteriorated by 
7.2 percentage points, but the farm did not become insolvent. The low leverage crop farm 
had a term debt coverage ratio of 3.13 in year one, putting it in the green zone. The 
diversified farm showed a yellow zone profitability positon in years six through 10, 
peaking at 8.2 percent in year 10. The diversified farm had only red zone level of debt 
repayment capacity all 10 years. 
 
Management Scenario Six 
 
Management scenario six was a debt management strategy, whereby farms sold 
off and replaced machinery at a rate of 10 percent per year in order to avoid taking on a 
large amount of new debt at a single point in time. 
Baseline Farms 
The crop farm had red zone liquidity up to year 10 when the current ratio reached 
1.6, a green zone position (table 4.25). The solvency of the crop farm improved ending 
year 10 down 29.8 percentage points from year one. The profitability of the crop farm 
was in the green zone from years two through 10. Debt repayment capacity was still an 
issue with nine years in the red zone and only one green zone year, but this was similar to 
the results of the original simulation. The cow-calf farm did not have much improvement 
other than in the profitability area. The debt-to-asset ratio increased 1.7 percentage 
points. Debt repayment capacity was weak. The diversified farm showed solvency 
improvement, with a 7 percentage point decrease in the debt-to-asset ratio. The 
diversified farm’s profitability was also improved with eight years of yellow zone rate of 
returns on equity.  
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Table 4.22: Management Scenario Five, Baseline Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 95.0% 104.9% 107.6% 109.9% 116.0% 121.4% 126.6% 131.7% 136.6% 141.3% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-72.9% -3724.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 2.5 1.4 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 64.4% 63.6% 61.2% 59.6% 69.6% 63.4% 63.0% 62.5% 61.8% 61.0% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
0.7% 0.6% 5.8% 6.6% 5.0% 5.1% 5.8% 6.4% 6.9% 7.2% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.52 0.46 0.62 0.60 0.78 0.58 0.55 0.78 0.77 0.77 
 
 
Table 4.23: Management Scenario Five, Two-Year Price Shock Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 100.0% 115.8% 119.7% 123.3% 126.9% 133.6% 140.2% 146.8% 153.4% 159.8% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-158.1% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 2.3 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.2% 65.1% 63.0% 62.4% 66.4% 66.3% 66.1% 65.8% 65.2% 64.6% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
-2.6% -2.5% 6.0% 6.8% 5.0% 5.1% 5.9% 6.5% 7.0% 7.5% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 
0.38 0.34 0.61 0.59 0.76 0.56 0.53 0.76 0.74 0.74 
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Table 4.24: Management Scenario Five, Four-Year Price Shock Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 25.1% 29.3% 39.0% 49.2% 66.2% 66.0% 65.3% 63.9% 61.8% 59.0% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-12.2% -7.1% -14.9% -16.8% 3.1% 3.6% 6.1% 8.4% 10.4% 12.1% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 53.3% 65.0% 78.1% 92.1% 10.1% 95.3% 98.0% 100.4% 102.4% 103.9% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-19.8% -25.5% -38.3% -71.2% 9.6% 358.6% 15.7% 140.7% n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D/A Ratio 100.0% 116.4% 134.7% 154.2% 152.1% 161.8% 171.7% 181.8% 192.2% 202.7% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-158.1% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 2.3 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.2% 65.2% 66.1% 68.5% 72.3% 72.6% 72.8% 72.8% 72.7% 72.4% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-2.6% -2.9% -2.0% -1.3% 5.0% 5.2% 6.1% 6.9% 7.6% 8.2% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 





Two-Year Price Shock Farms 
Results for the two-year price shock farms were mixed (table 4.26). The crop 
farm became technically insolvent in year two, but the diversified farm reduced their 
debt-to-asset ratio by 2.9 percentage points. The debt-to-asset ratio of the cow-calf farm 
increased 2.5 percentage points. The cow-calf farm had five years of green zone 
profitability and five years of yellow zone rate of returns on equity. The diversified farm 
also has eight years of fair profitability ratios. No change in pattern was observed in the 
term debt coverage ratio for any of the three farms. 
Four-Year Price Shock Farms 
Improvements in solvency, profitability, and repayment capacity were seen with 
the four-year price shock farms (table 4.27). The low and medium leverage crop farms 
improved their debt-to-asset ratios, the low leverage farm by 15.5 percentage points and 
the medium leverage farm by 38.8 percentage points. The medium leverage crop farm 
moved from a yellow zone solvency position to a green zone one by the end of year 10. 
The high leverage farm reached technical insolvency in year two and ended with a 135 
percent debt-to-asset ratio. Profitability is in the green zone three years for the low 
leverage crop farm, and six years for the medium leverage crop farm and the cow-calf 
farm. The diversified farm maintained a yellow zone solvency position for all ten years 
with the debt-to-asset ratio increasing 1.7 percentage points from year one to year 10. The 
low leverage crop farm had seven years with a term debt coverage ratio in the green zone. 
The medium leverage crop farm had two years of green zone debt repayment capacity 
and four years of yellow zone capacity. The debt repayment capacity for the cow-calf 




Table 4.25: Management Scenario Six, Baseline Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.6 
D/A Ratio 86.3% 86.0% 83.9% 79.6% 83.6% 81.5% 77.0% 71.8% 64.9% 56.5% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
2.8% 17.9% 29.8% 37.5% 24.7% 24.6% 32.8% 36.4% 36.0% 33.6% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0. 1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.2% 65.2% 65.6% 65.8% 66.1% 66.4% 66.5% 66.7% 66.8% 66.9% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
12.4% 8.9% 9.2% 9.5% 9.6% 9.8% 9.9% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 63.5% 62.6% 62.0% 61.1% 62.5% 61.8% 60.8% 59.7% 58.2% 56.6% 
Rate of Return 
on Equity 
4.6% 4.2% 5.2% 6.0% 5.3% 5.5% 6.3% 7.0% 7.5% 8.0% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 









Table 4.26: Management Scenario Six, Two-Year Price Shock Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
D/A Ratio 94.4% 104.6% 105.8% 105.5% 105.3% 107.0% 107.0% 104.7% 99.4% 90.2% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-69.0% -846.9% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 310.3% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0. 1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.5% 66.0% 66.4% 66.7% 67.0% 67.3% 67.5% 67.6% 67.8% 68.0% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
11.1% 8.3% 9.3% 9.6% 9.7% 9.9% 10.0% 10.1% 10.2% 10.2% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 64.7% 66.1% 65.7% 65.1% 66.4% 66.0% 65.3% 64.4% 63.2% 61.8% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-0.1% -0.3% 5.2% 6.1% 5.4% 5.5% 6.4% 7.2% 7.9% 8.4% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 









Table 4.27: Management Scenario Six, Four-Year Price Shock Farms Simulation Results 




Current Ratio 0.3 0.7 3.7 8.8 3.4 5.1 6.5 7.8 8.9 262,745 
D/A Ratio 15.5% 7.4% 2.3% 1.2% 23.6% 19.7% 15.3% 10.5% 5.3% 0.0% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-5.4% 1.8% -2.0% -0.5% 8.2% 7.9% 9.1% 10.0% 10.6% 10.9% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.4 2.6 3.6 38.0 
D/A Ratio 45.0% 46.7% 48.0% 48.8% 58.0% 39.5% 29.7% 22.6% 14.7% 6.2% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-9.0% -7.4% -5.9% -3.8% 13.9% 33.3% 13.5% 15.3% 16.1% 16.2% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 94.4% 104.6% 116.0% 128.9% 124.9% 130.1% 134.2% 136.8% 137.3% 135.0% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-69.0% -846.9% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 65.5% 66.0% 66.6% 67.2% 67.5% 67.8% 68.0% 68.2% 68.4% 68.6% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
11.1% 8.3% 8.6% 8.9% 9.8% 10.0% 10.1% 10.2% 10.3% 10.3% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 




Current Ratio 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
D/A Ratio 64.7% 66.1% 67.3% 68.4% 69.8% 69.6% 69.2% 68.5% 67.6% 66.4% 
Rate of Return on 
Equity 
-0.1% -0.3% 0.4% 1.2% 5.4% 5.6% 6.6% 7.5% 8.3% 8.9% 
Term Debt 
Coverage Ratio 










This analysis was conducted to further explore patterns of farm financial stress. 
Results were used to determine the factors that contribute the most to farm financial 
stress, compare the effects of price and debt on the survivability of a farm business, and 
to determine the factors associated with successful transition through periods of farm 
financial stress. The results of this study show the impact that output prices and debt have 
on a farm business, especially the combination of low prices and high debt. Expectations 
were developed to analyze how various management strategies could affect the 
performance of an Oklahoma farm business. These expectations evaluate the effects of 
prices, debt, type of production, and management decisions on how farm businesses can 
survive periods of farm financial stress. 
Under the framework of this analysis, there was virtually no relief for the crop 
farm; 30 out of 39 (76.9 percent) of cases had a higher debt-to-asset ratio at the end of the 
simulation. Of the 30 cases that got worse, 25 (83.3 percent) became technically insolvent 
at some point. One case, the high leverage crop farm with a two-year price
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shock, under management scenario six (debt management) became technically insolvent 
in year two, but by year 10 the debt-to-asset ratio was 4.2 percentage points lower than it 
was in year one. Of the management scenarios, management scenario six made the most 
impact on the crop farms improving three out of the five cases. Since this scenario 
imposed lower debt obligations on the crop farm in the middle years, it could be 
concluded that aggressively managing debt especially in periods of low output prices, is a 
way to move through periods of farm financial stress. Further research should evaluate 
the role that the cost of debt plays on farm survivability, especially in periods of low crop 
commodity prices. 
The picture was even worse for the highly leveraged crop farms. Of the 21 highly 
leverage crop farms evaluated, 20 had a worse solvency position by the end of the 10-
year simulation. Out of the 20 that declined, 18 reached technical insolvency. 
Management scenarios two, three, four, and five (changing cropping pattern and selling 
land) all had no positive impact on the crop farms. Management scenarios two, three, and 
four all made the crop farms evaluated reach technical insolvency quicker than in the 
original baseline simulations.  
 A better outlook existed when evaluating the cow-calf operations. A 57 
percentage point improvement rate was observed for all the cow-calf farms tested. The 
most important aspect to consider was that none of the cow-calf farms from the baseline 
cases or the management scenario cases became technically insolvent. This could be 
attributed to the impact that prices play in this simulation. Since the current (January 12, 
2018) price for cattle used in the simulations was only 2.3 percent lower than the 10-year 
average price (compared to the current price for wheat which was 39.4 percent lower than 
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the 10-year average price), the price shock for the cow-calf farms, even when shocked for 
four years, was not as harmful to the survivability of the farm as was the price shocks on 
the crop farms. Even negative effects were marginal, with six out of nine farms that had 
an increased debt-to-asset ratio increasing less than five percentage points from year one 
to year 10.  
Management scenarios two and three were the most effective for improving the 
financial health of the cow-calf farms with a 100 percent success rate. Both of these 
management scenarios had the cow-calf farms selling off a portion of their owned land. 
This sale infused liquidity into the operations. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that 
this infusion of liquidity assisted the cow-calf farms in weathering the periods low output 
prices. Other research should analyze the financial conditions of a representative cow-calf 
operation when output prices experience a decline similar to the representative crop farm 
in this simulation. 
 Results from the diversified farms were mixed; 37 percent of the 27 cases realized 
an improved debt-to-asset ratio by the end of year 10. The diversified farms saw the 
lowest rate of technical insolvency, with only two out of 27 cases (7.4 percent) reaching 
that level. As opposed to the crop and cow-calf farms, most of the increased debt-to-asset 
ratios were greater than five percent. Management scenarios five and six (changing 
cropping pattern and selling land, and debt management) had the best effect on the 
diversified farms, improving the results for the baseline diversified farm and the 
diversified price shock farm. Like the crop farm, there was no relief for the diversified 
farm under a four-year price shock in the baseline cases or any management scenario. 
103 
 
 Management scenario one (production cost reduction) had an 18.2 percent rate of 
improvement, and an 18.2 percent rate of technical insolvency. Six of the nine farms that 
did not improve their debt-to-asset ratio saw an increase of less than five percent. 
Management scenario two only had a positive impact on the high leverage cow-calf 
farms. The parameters of management scenario two make it reasonable to say that that 
the improvement for the cow-calf farms was due to the sale of pastureland since the 
proceeds from the land sale could be allocated to covering debt obligations. The rate of 
technical insolvency for management scenario two was 63.6 percent.  
Management scenario three (changed cropping pattern and selling of owned land) 
yielded results similar to management scenario two. The rate of improvement remained 
27.3 percent, but the rate of technical insolvency was improved to 45.5 percent. The 
farms that improved were still only the cow-calf farms, most likely the result of the sale 
of pastureland as described previously. It is important to recognize that no diversified 
farm reached technical insolvency, most likely as a result of the sale of pastureland. 
 Management scenario four (changed cropping pattern and selling of owned land) 
provided the worst results of all the management scenarios with a zero percent 
improvement rate. Five of the eight simulations (62.5 percent) became technically 
insolvent. Therefore, based on these simulation results it is unlikely that planting only 
wheat for two years and selling owned pastureland will be a successful strategy for 
navigating financial stress. Management scenario five showed marginal improvement 
from management scenario four. There was an improvement rate of 25 percent, and the 
technical insolvency rate decreased to 50 percent. The two farms that improved were both 
diversified farms, again pointing to the impact the sale of pastureland had on farm 
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financial health in this analysis. The most impactful management scenario was the sixth 
one. Management scenario six had an improvement rate of 45.5 percent, the highest in 
this analysis, and a technical insolvency rate of 18.2 percent (the lowest along with 
management scenario 1). Of the six cases that did not improve their solvency, four of the 
six had declined solvency of less than five percent. This provides evidence to support the 





The recent downturn in farm income is an indicator that widespread financial 
stress might be occurring in agriculture, but will this financial stress morph into a full-
scale financial crisis? This research suggests that good farm financial management is a 
key to weathering the current financial downturn in agriculture. While the farm financial 
crisis of the 1980s was triggered by multiple factors including a collapsing export market, 
low crop commodity prices, a strong U.S. dollar, and historically high interest rates, 
today’s conditions are markedly different. Interest rates have been historically low 
following the Great Recession of the late 2000s, and land values are at historically high 
levels.  
In addition to the changed interest rate environment and increased land values, 
federal farm policy is different today than it was in the 1980s and even the 1990s. The 
Payment-in-Kind (PIK) program introduced in 1983 paid farmers to idle acreage as a 
means to reduce production and stocks of surplus commodities (USDA ERS 1983). 
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Additionally the 1985 Farm Bill initiated the Conservation Reserve Program which was 
aimed at taking environmentally sensitive land out of production in exchange for a rental 
payment. The direct payments introduced in the 1996 Farm Bill were eliminated in The 
Agricultural Act of 2014. At the same time the Congress shifted the focus of federal 
agricultural policy from subsidies to risk management. This research suggests that in 
addition to production and price risk management (the focus of current farm policy), 
producers also need to be concerned about financial risk.  
From the simulations, it became clear that output price changes had a significant 
impact on the financial survival of a farm confirming expectation one. This was 
especially true when the amount of debt increased, as financial stress increased and farm 
survivability was jeopardized when high debt levels were combined with low output 
prices confirming expectation two. Brake and Boehlje (1985) suggested debt reduction by 
lenders as a way for farmers to survive the farm crisis of the 1980s, but this was shown to 
be prohibitively expensive to the agriculture sector. Another method suggested to reduce 
debt obligations was to reduce interest rates (Boehlje, Thamodaran, and Barkema 1985; 
Brake and Boehlje 1985; Doye and Jolly 1987). In the 1980s this would have been 
possible since interest rates were high, but would be impractical in the current interest 
rate environment. 
In this analysis, the operations that included livestock production were not as 
negatively affected by an increased debt load. This was most likely due to a combination 
of cattle prices that were near the 10-year average and the increased asset values on the 
balance sheet. On the diversified farms, high cattle prices compensated for lower crop 
prices in most cases. All of these results combine to confirm expectation three that farms 
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which included a livestock component would have a lower degree of financial stress 
through periods of low commodity output prices. It is also clear that where the operation 
is in their loan payoff plays a critical role. The success of management scenario six 
suggests a way to mitigate the effects of financial stress, and confirms expectation four 
which stated that management strategies existed which would successfully move a farm 
business through a period of financial stress.  
Asset management and restructuring, specifically the creation of landholding 
entities as suggested by Jolly and Doye (1985) would benefit farms in the current 
financial conditions as evidence by the effects of management scenarios two, three, four, 
and five on the diversified farms, and management scenarios two and three on the cow-
calf farms. Management scenarios two, three, four, and five also show that farm 
managers must be prudent about their crop production decisions. Planting a significant 
amount of wheat where average returns are lower than the cost of production will lead to 
financial stress. Also planting a mix of crops that includes a large amount of a high input 
crop like soybeans will lead to the same results. However, these management scenarios 
only helped certain types of farms. No management scenario was able to improve every 
farm type at all leverage positions. This suggests that high amounts of debt are not able to 
be reduced in the 10 year structure of this analysis. 
For highly leveraged farms, there appear to be very few options to reduce their 
financial stress and improve their solvency position. This indicates that while low crop 
commodity prices might be the trigger of financial stress, the total amount of debt is the 
determining factor in the survivability of a farm business. Batte, Farr, and Lee in 1989 
stated “financial stability in the farm sector will be achieved through improved 
107 
 
profitability, not credit subsidies.” The economic conditions of today’s Oklahoma farm 
sector suggest that improved profitability, and active debt management are the keys to 









American Bankers’ Association (ABA). 2017. “2016 Farm Bank Performance Report.”   
Available at: 
https://www.aba.com/Press/Documents/2016FarmBankPerformanceReport.pdf. 
Accessed on 10 March 2018. 
Barnett, B.J. 2000. “The U.S. Farm Crisis of the 1980s.” Agricultural History 74(2):366-
380. 
Batte, M.T., W.F. Farr, and T.J. Lee. 1989. “Effects of Selected Credit Programs on Farm 
Financial Survival.” North Central Journal of Agricultural Economics 11(1): 131-
144. 
Boehlje, M. 1986. “Farm Financial Stress and the US Farm Crisis: Origins and 
Dimensions of the Problem.” Staff paper, Dept. of Agricultural and Applied 
Econ., University of Minnesota. 
Boehlje, M.D., R. Thamodaran, and A.D. Barkema. 1985. "Agricultural Policy and 
Financial Stress." Working paper, Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development, Iowa State University. 
Brake, J.R., and M.D. Boehlje. 1985. "Solutions (or Resolutions) of Financial Stress 
Problems from the Private and Public Sectors." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 67(5): 1123-1128. 
109 
 
Briggeman, B.C., 2011. "The Importance of Off-Farm Income to Servicing Farm Debt.” 
Economic Review. Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Available 
at: 
https://www.kansascityfed.org/NhUOQ/publicat/econrev/pdf/11q1briggeman.pdf. 
Accessed on 24 March 2017. 
Briggeman, B.C., 2010. "Debt, Income and Farm Financial Stress.” The Main Street 
Economist. Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Available at: 
https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/mse/mse_0610.pdf. Accessed on 24 
March 2017. 
Burns, C., S. Tulman, and J.M. Harris. 2015. "Farm Financial Stress in a Changing 
Economic Environment: Simulating Credit Risk with New Imputed ARMS Data 
on Farm Debt." Paper presented at WAEA annual meeting, San Francisco CA, 
26-28 July. 
Carter, H.O. 1963. “Representative Farms – Guides for Decision Making?” Journal of 
Farm Economics. 45(5): 1448-1455. 
D’ Antoni, J., A.K. Mishra, and S. Chintawar. 2009. "Predicting Financial Stress in 
Young and Beginning Farmers in the United States." Paper presented at SAEA 
annual meeting, Atlanta GA, 31 January-3 February. 
Davis, I.G. 1936. “Types of Farming and Types of Farming Areas in Connecticut.” Agr. 





Dinterman, R., A.L. Katchova, and J.M. Harris. 2018. “Financial Stress and Farm 
Bankruptcies in US Agriculture.” Agricultural Finance Review. Available at: 
https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/AFR-05-2017-0030. Accessed 
on 10 March 2018.  
Doye, D. 2014. “Farm and Ranch Stress Test.” Dept. Agr Econ. Bull. No. 237, Oklahoma 
State University, July. 
Doye, D.G., and R.W. Jolly. 1987. “Model for US Farm Financial Adjustment Analysis 
of Alternative Public Policies.” Working paper, Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development, Iowa State University. 
Edwards, W. 2015. “Estimating Farm Machinery Costs.” Ag Decision Maker. A3-29, 
Iowa State University, May. 
Elliott, F.F. 1928. “The ‘Representative Firm’ Idea Applied to Research and Extension in 
Agricultural Economics.” Journal of Farm Economics 10(4): 483-498. 
Elliott, F.F., J.W. Tapp, and R.E. Willard. 1928. Types of Farming in North Dakota. 
Washington DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Technical Report No. 102, 
December. 
Featherstone, A.M., T.C. Schroeder, and R.O. Burton, Jr. 1988. “Allocation of Farm 
Financial Stress Among Income, Leverage, and Interest Rate Components: A 
Kansas Example.” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 20(2): 15-24. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 2018. “Ag Credit Survey Fixed Interest Rates.” 
Available at: 
https://www.kansascityfed.org/research/indicatorsdata/agcreditsurvey. Accessed 
on 18 February 2018. 
111 
 
FINPACK. 2018. “FINPACK.” University of Minnesota Center for Farm Financial 
Management. St. Paul, MN. Available at: https://www.cffm.umn.edu/finpack/.  
Ford Motor Credit Company. 2017. “Ford Credit Financing Options.” Dearborn, MI. 
Available at: https://www.ford.com/finance/finance-options#/. Accessed on 18 
December 2017. 
Gabriel, S. 2017. “Why we are not Facing Another 1980s-Style Farm Sector Crisis.” 
Farm Credit Administration. Virginia, August. Available at: 
https://www.fca.gov/Download/EconomicReports/WhyWeAreNotFacingAnother
1980sStyleFarmSectorCrisis.pdf. Accessed on 18 February 2018. 
Ginder, R.G., K.E. Stone, and D. Otto. 1985. “Impact of the Farm Financial Crisis on 
Agribusiness Firms and Rural Communities.” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 67(5): 1184-1190. 
Harl, N.E. 1990. The Farm Debt Crisis of the 1980s.” Ames, IA. Iowa State University 
Press. 
Holmes, C.L. 1923. “Type of Farming in Iowa.” Agr. Expt. Sta. Bul. 256, Iowa State 
College of Agriculture. 
Hughes, W., J.W. Richardson, and M.E. Rister. 1985. "Effects of Sustained Financial 
Stress on the Financial Structure and Performance of the Farm Sector." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 67(5): 1116-1122. 
John Deere US. 2017. “Loans and Leasing.” Moline, IL. Available at: 




Jolly, R.W., A. Paulsen, J.D. Johnson, K.H. Baum, and R. Prescott. 1985. "Incidence, 
Intensity, and Duration of Financial Stress Among Farm Firms." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 67(5): 1108-1115. 
Jolly, R.W., and D.G. Doye. 1985. “Farm Income and the Financial Condition of United 
States Agriculture.” Staff paper, Dept. of Economics, Food and Agricultural 
Policy Research Institute, Iowa State University. 
Kauffman, N., and M. Clark. 2017. “Farm Lending Stabilizes, but Bank Liquidity 
Tightening.” Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 
Kauffman, N., and M. Clark. 2016. “Financial Stress in Farm Sector Shows Slow but 
Steady Increase.” Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 
Key, N., D. Prager, and C. Burns. 2017. Farm Household Income Volatility: An Analysis 
Using Panel Data from a National Survey. Washington DC: U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, ERS Report No. 226. February. Available at: 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/82564/err-226.pdf?v=42787. 
Accessed on 12 February 2018. 
Köbrich, C., T. Rehman, and M. Kahn. 2003. “Typification of Farming Systems for 
Constructing Representative Farm Models: Two Illustrations of the Application of 
Multi-Variate Analyses in Chile and Pakistan.” Agricultural Systems 76(1): 141-
157. 
Leistritz, F.L., A.G. Leholm, H.G. Vreugdenhil, and B.L. Ekstrom. 1986. “Effect of Farm 
Financial Stress on Off-Farm Work Behavior of Farm Operators and Spouses in 




Litkowski, C., K. Patrick, D. Prager, D. Subedi, T. Covey, J. Hopkins. 2018. 2018 Farm 
Sector Income Forecast. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, ERS. 
7 February. Available at: https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-
sector-income-finances/farm-sector-income-forecast/. Accessed on 10 February 
2018. 
Market Report. 2018. “Oklahoma Cattle Prices.” Cattle.com. Available at: 
https://www.cattle.com/markets/states.aspx?state=oklahoma. Accessed on 12 
January 2018. 
Marshall, A. 1920. Principles of Economics: An Introductory Volume. 8th edition. 
London. Macmillan and Co., Ltd. 
Marshall, T. 2017. Annual Wheat Review. Washington DC: U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, NASS. Available at: 
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/Oklahoma/Publications/Oklahoma
_Crop_Reports/2017/ok_wheat_review_2017.pdf. Accessed on 24 February 2018. 
Mighell, R.L., and J.D. Black. 1951. Interregional Competition in Agriculture: with 
Special Reference to Dairy Farming in the Lake States and New England. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Nutt, P.J., and J.R. Skees. 1990. “Development of Financial Relationships Within Farm 






Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). 2017. “Comptroller’s Handbook.” 
Available at: https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-
type/comptrollers-handbook/agricultural-lending/pub-ch-agricultural-lending.pdf. 
Accessed on 10 March 2018. 
Oklahoma Department of Agriculture, Food, and Forestry (ODAFF). 2017. “Oklahoma 
Agricultural Statistics 2017.” Oklahoma City, OK. Available at: 
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/Oklahoma/Publications/Annual_St
atistical_Bulletin/ok_bulletin_2017.pdf. Accessed on 10 December 2017. 
Oklahoma State University (OSU). 2018. “Oklahoma Agricultural Land Values.” 
Department of Agricultural Economics. Stillwater, OK. Available at: 
http://agecon.okstate.edu/oklandvalues/avg_values.asp?id=B. Accessed on 12 
January 2018. 
Oklahoma State University (OSU). 2017. “Sample Oklahoma Enterprise Budget 
Summaries.” Department of Agricultural Economics. Stillwater, OK. Available 
at: http://www.agecon.okstate.edu/budgets/sample_pdf_files.asp. Accessed on 10 
December 2017. 
Peoples, K.L., D. Freshwater, G.D. Hanson, P.T. Prentice, and E.P. Thor. 1992. Anatomy 
of an American Agricultural Credit Crisis: Farm Debt in the 1980s. Maryland. 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Petrulis, M., B.L. Green, F. Hines, R. Nolan, and J. Sommer. 1987. How Is Farm 
Financial Stress: Affecting Rural America? Washington DC: U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, ERS Report No. 568, June. Available at: 
https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED283653. Accessed on 12 February 2017. 
115 
 
Richardson, J.W., J.L. Outlaw, G.M. Knapek, J.M. Raulston, B.K. Herbst, D.P. 
Anderson, H.L. Bryant, S.L. Klose, and P. Zimmel. 2016. “Representative Farms 
Economic Outlook for the January 2017 FAPRI/AFPC Baseline.” Working Paper, 
Dept. of Agr. Econ., Texas A&M University. 
Taussig, F.W. 1918. Principles of Economics, Vol. 2 2nd. ed. New York. The Macmillan 
Company. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA ERS). 2018. “Value 
Added Years by State.” Washington, DC. Available at: 
https://data.ers.usda.gov/reports.aspx?ID=17830#Pe00af493c3a84cdeaa3a6a542e
9ccccb_2_109iT0R0x36. Accessed on 12 January 2018. 
USDA ERS. 1983. “An Initial Assessment of the Payment-in-Kind Program.” 
Washington, DC. Available at: 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/42744/9380_ap039_1_.pdf?v=41
498. Accessed on 25 April 2018. 
USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA NASS). 2018. “Oklahoma Grain 
Elevator Cash Bids.” Oklahoma City. Available at: 
https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ok_gr110.txt. Accessed on 12 January 
2018. 
USDA NASS. 2017a. “Corn, Grain - Price Received, Measured in $/bu.” Washington, 
DC. Available at: https://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/results/B1464E81-18AF-320E-
A149-9F0F7316730B. Accessed on 10 December 2017. 
116 
 
USDA NASS. 2017b. “Wheat, Winter - Price Received, Measured in $/bu.” Washington, 
DC. Available at: https://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/results/DDFC19B5-5BE8-
32E7-B5CA-9C80F3C33C92. Accessed on 10 December 2017. 
USDA NASS. 2017c. “Soybeans - Price Received, Measured in $/bu.” Washington, DC. 
Available at: https://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/results/8842F951-E2FB-3814-
86AB-638F35B8A0FF. Accessed on 10 December 2017. 
USDA NASS. 2017d. “Rent, Cash, Cropland - Expense, Measured in $/ac.” Washington, 
DC. Available at: https://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/results/4CCE87DF-A60A-
38B8-9F91-0B834E6FF687. Accessed on 10 December 2017. 
USDA NASS. 2017e. “Rent, Cash, Pastureland - Expense, Measured in $/ac.” 
Washington, DC. Available at: 
https://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/results/4CCE87DF-A60A-38B8-9F91-
0B834E6FF687. Accessed on 10 December 2017. 
USDA NASS. 2017f. “Oklahoma Corn County Estimates.” Washington, DC. Available 
at: 
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/Oklahoma/Publications/County_E
stimates/2017/ok_ce_corn_2017.pdf. Accessed on 24 February 2018. 
USDA NASS. 2017g. “Oklahoma Soybean County Estimates.” Washington, DC. 
Available at: 
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/Oklahoma/Publications/County_E




USDA NASS. 2016a. “Oklahoma Corn County Estimates.” Washington, DC. Available 
at: 
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/Oklahoma/Publications/County_E
stimates/2016/ok_ce_corn_2016.pdf. Accessed on 24 February 2018. 
USDA NASS. 2016b. “Oklahoma Soybean County Estimates.” Washington, DC. 
Available at: 
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/Oklahoma/Publications/County_E
stimates/2016/ok_ce_soybean_2016.pdf. Accessed on 24 February 2018. 
Wilcox, W.W. 1938. “Types of Farming Research and Farm Management.” Journal of 
Farm Economics. 20(2): 417-429. 
Wyant, S. 2008. “Memories of Agriculture Secretary Earl Butz.” Agri-Pulse 
Communications, Inc. Available at: https://www.agri-
pulse.com/ext/resources/pdfs/0/2/1/0/8/021008.pdf. Accessed on 1 November 
2017.  
Zhang, W., and K. Tidgren. 2018. “The Current Downturn vs the 1920s and 1980s Farm 
Crises.” Agricultural Finance Review. Available at: 
https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/AFR-08-2017-0075. 
Accessed on 10 March 2018.  
Zhang, W. 2017. “Four Reasons Why We Aren’t Likely to See a Replay of the 1980s 
Farm Crisis.” Agricultural Policy Review. Spring Issue, Center for Agricultural 
and Rural Development, Ames, IA. Available at: 
https://www.card.iastate.edu/ag_policy_review/pdf/spring-2017.pdf. Accessed on 
10 March 2018. 
118 
 
Zimmel, P. 2012. “FAPRI Beginning Farmer and Rancher Development Project North 
Central Feedgrain and Cow-Calf Representative Farm Final Report.” Working 
paper, Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute, University of Missouri. 
Zimmel, P. 2008. “Baseline Outlook Missouri Representative Farms.” Working paper, 







Example FINPACK Simulation Results Report 
 
The images on the following pages are included to serve as an example of the 
report generated by FINPACK at the end of a ten-year simulation. The results for this 
analysis are taken from the “Financial Standards Measures” section of the report. The 
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